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Fernanda Nicola*
The European Union (EL is 'gomg local"by taking decentralization ofpower seriously in
order to create greater effectiveness for European law and policy especially with respect to its
economic development or cohesion policy strategies. In this vein, the Treaty of Lisbon has
modified the subsidiarityprnciple now includig a "regional and local" dinension while offerng
new legal and political safeguards to protect subnational actors from the reach of EU law
However, in EU cohesion policy cities, regions, and Lander in the different Member States are
'lumped together' into a third-level Europe that does not differentiate among these subnational
actors. In addition, despite the attempt to connect Europe to its subnational evel to enhance local
autonomy and tenitorial cohesion, European courts do not always recognize the local level as
independent from their Member State. As a result, EU cohesion policies attempting to narrow the
welfare inbalances among European regions are not temitonally attuned flexible enough, or
equipped with accountability mechanisms capable to address the development problems they are
designed to solve.
Scholars have shed light on the invisibility of local actors by proposing to strengthen their
"input legitimacy" (process and participation) through greater representation before EU decision-
making processes or European courts. By focusing on EU-wide procedures instead of
understanding how differnt legal and geographical factors charactenze each tenitory EUscholars
have reframed from addresshig whether increasing decentralization is accomplishing the desired
development goals and inproving the "output legitimacy" (effectiveness of rgulation) of EU
institutions.' This Article instead offeis a 'thick" descrption of EU cohesion policies aimed at
creating economic development and tenitorial cohesion by disbursing EUfunding to the European
peripheries. Rather than assessing if these policies enhance local autonomy and decentralization
through EU-local cooperation, I demonstrate that oflen they foster centralization and produce new
conflicts among heterogeneous subnational actors, Member States, and the EU Through a textured
account of local power in Germany Greece, and Italy I suggest that a more contextualized and
needs-based approach to cohesion policies, which acknowledges tenitonal and socio-economic
disparities in each region, would anticipate and evade the shortcomings of curaent EU cohesion
policy This Article departs from notions of local autonomy and decentralization of power to
iprove the "nput legitimacy" of EU institutions by suggesting that the findings on cohesion
policy-the need to pay greater attention to local heterogeneity and to create accountability
mechanisms to monitor disbursement policies-are important lessons about local governance in
the EU that should "travel" to other regulatory areas.
* C 2011 Fernanda Nicola. Associate Professor, Washington College of Law, American
University. Paper Presented at the following conferences: "The State of the European Economic
Union" organized by the EU Center of Excellence, American University, Washington DC (Nov.
2010), at Tulane Law School, New Orleans, at the conference on The European Union 20 Years
Afler Maastricht-Transatlantic Perspectives (Mar. 2011), and the Law and Society Association
in San Francisco (June 2011). I am grateful to Bill Davies, Jane Bestor, Daniela Caruso, Jerry
Frug, Paul Nihoul, Marc Pollack, and Brishen Rogers for their comments and to Paul Oliver
Eisler for his excellent research assistance. Errors are mine only.
1. See FRiTz W SCHARPF, COMMUNITY AND AUTONOMY INSTITUTIONS, POLICIES AND
LEGITIMACY IN MULTILEVEL EUROPE 176 (2010) (defining input and output democracy).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today cities, provinces, regions, and LAlder are affected by the
changes triggered by EU law and policy. Lawyers and scholars have
increasingly acknowledged and investigated such changes by showing
the connection between Europe and its local communities. Local
differences have become an integral part of the EU decentralization
strategy through slogans such as "Europe of the regions," "sustainable
urban growth," and of course, the EU motto "united in diversity."' In
promoting this strategy, technocrats, lawyers, and politicians have
lumped together cities, regions, provinces, and Ldnder into a single
category of "third level Europe."' However, this strategy of lumping
subnational actors often conceals, rather than clarifies, what the effects of
EU law and politics are on the different local actors. For instance, this
2. See Uitedn Diversity, EUR. COMM'N, http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/motto/indexen.
htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (remarking that "'United in diversity' is the motto of the
European Union").
3. See THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A THIRD LEVEL
EUROPE? (Charlie Jeffery ed., 1997).
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lumping strategy hides the fact that each Member State distributes power
differently among its local actors. As a result, it is difficult to understand
how different constitutional regimes and different territorial problems
influence the effects of EU cohesion policy and more in general of EU
regulation at the local level.
This Article demonstrates the impact of EU cohesion policy on
subnational actors through a comparative study of their effects in Greece,
Germany, and Italy. While Germany is a federal state with the highest
degree of local autonomy for its Linder, Greece is a unitary state in
which prefectures and cities have little autonomy. As a middle ground
between Greece and Germany, Italy has experienced, in the last ten years,
its regions gaining more autonomy from the central government. A
textured account shows the way in which EU cohesion policy, aiming to
narrow territorial wealth disparities, has empowered or disempowered
local governments in the different Member States.'
In analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of EU cohesion policy, I
adopt some insights from U.S. local government law scholarship. First,
local autonomy does not happen in a vacuum because both state and
federal background regimes structure the decision-making power of
subnational actors.! Likewise, EU law and policy redistribute power
among local actors in a way that is highly dependent both on
supranational and state background rules as well as on the intranational
distribution of economic and cultural power within each state.! Thus,
local governments in the EU have a wide range of possibilities to
cooperate or resist the implementation of EU regulation and collaborate
or collide with Brussels in implementing European policies.' Second, a
4. For a differentiation between unitary, federal and regional states, see VIVIEN A.
SCHMIDT, DEMOCRACY IN EUROPE: THE EU AND NATIONAL POLITIES (2006).
5. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: How STATES STIFLE URBAN
INNOVATION (2008).
6. Despite some important comparative federal scholarship on EU and U.S. federal
models, no comparative federalism author has focused on these background regimes and the
increasing intranational heterogeneity among local actors. See Ernest A. Young, Protecting
Member State Autonomy in the European Union: Some Cautionary Tales from American
Federalism, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1612, 1654 (2002); Daniel J. Meltzer, Member State Liability in
Europe and the United States, 4 INT'L J. CONST. L. 39, 39-43 (2006); George A. Bermann, Taling
Subsidianty Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94
COLUM. L. REv. 331 (1994); Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of
Commandeering, in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 213 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
7. See Gerald E. Frug, Empowering Cities ma Federal System, 19 U RB. LAw. 553, 554
(1987) (showing that federal-local cooperation does not necessarily empower local actors by
creating greater local autonomy, but rather, it can backfire by reinforcing state or federal control
of local decision making).
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contextual and geographical understanding of each territory is important
to achieve an economic development strategy while avoiding backlashes
against the "spatial economic structure that is resistant to alteration."'
Because decentralization does not happen in a legal or geographical
vacuum, rather there are legal and territorial structures already in place
that will be key to understanding beforehand in order determine the
effects of any policy aiming to empower the local level through either
explicitly redistributive policies (cohesion) or other regulatory strategies
(i.e., environmental or competition policy).
To understand the commitment to decentralization of power in
cohesion policy, Part I explains the changes introduced by the Treaty of
Lisbon vis-a-vis the subsidiarity principle and the enhanced role of the
Committee of the Regions (CoR) in giving its opinions on EU cohesion
policy. It then analyzes how different scholarly visions of decentrali-
zation have influenced current proposals to reform EU cohesion policy.'
Despite the different approaches, both visions seek to legitimize
European integration from below by creating a stronger connection
between Brussels and its local communities." In lumping together
subnational actors into a third-level Europe, however, scholars are far
more preoccupied with the processes of achieving local autonomy rather
than the substance of the development and regional policies they are
advocating.
Part II offers a textured account of the effects of cohesion policies in
an Italian region, a German L&ider, and three Greek cities. The aim is to
show that EU-local cooperation in the name of decentralizing power can
create positive as well as negative consequences for local development.
In some cases, EU-regional cooperation can ameliorate local economic
conditions; in others, however, it can backfire all together and ultimately
it substitutes supranational for state control of the region."
In departing from local autonomy demands, this Article shows that
in order to achieve effective economic development by narrowing wealth
imbalances among regions, cohesion policy ought to devote greater
8. See Richard C. Schragger, Decentalization and Development 96 VA. L. REv. 1837,
1888-93 (2010) (arguing that government policies aimed at improving economic performance in
particular areas tend not to further decentralization).
9. J.H.H. Weiler, The Tansformation ofEurope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1990-1991).
10. Richard T. Ford, Lawk Terntory (A History of Juisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REv. 843
(1998-1999). In embracing decentralization, cultural difference and local diversity, these lawyers
reproduce a "paradoxical differentiation" by which the constant production of diversity and
localism is not the enemy but rather "the child of the modem state." SeeYishai Blank, Localism
m the New Global Order, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 263 (2006).
11. See Jerry Frug, DecenterngDecentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv 253 (1993); GERALD
E. FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999).
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attention to the geographic, social, and economic disparities
characterizing each European periphery. In reassessing the
decentralization commitments of EU cohesion policy, this Article
proposes a more tailored analysis of local heterogeneity, territorial
conflicts, and better accountability mechanisms to manage EU-funded
projects in different regions.
II. THE EU Is "GOING LOCAL"
Since the mid-1980s, the Commission has launched numerous
initiatives, buttressed by a large body of academic literature, to connect
local governments, such as cities, provinces, and regions, to the process
of European integration. 2 Local autonomy and decentralization
strategies were deployed by Brussels as a form of resistance vis-A-vis the
homogenizing and globalizing pressure of the single market at the
expense of local commerce." With the Treaty of Maastricht expanding
European competences and at the same time introducing the subsidiarity
principle into the treaty, the newly created EU did not present a threat but
rather an enhancement of local autonomy and decentralization.14
Cohesion policy was already part of the Treaty, article 158 EC,
connecting Brussels to the regions "lagging behind" by means of a
disbursement mechanism such as the European Regional Development
Fund (article 160 EC, not article 176 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU)).
Cities, regions, provinces, and Linder in each Member State have
contributed to the transformation of Europe by supporting or resisting the
various patterns of legal integration that took place in the last fifty years.
In the early stages of integration until at least the early 1990s, however,
local governments were invisible to the European architecture, and they
rarely appeared in mainstream scholarly accounts. 5 Nonetheless, some
12. See, e.g., PATRICK LE GALtS, EUROPEAN CITIEs: SOCIAL CONFICTS AND GOVERNANCE
(2002).
13. See Andy Storey, Ctr. for Dev. Studies, Presentation at the National University of
Ireland Maynooth Conference: The European Project: Dismantling Social Democracy,
Globalising Neoliberalism (Apr. 3, 2004).
14. See Urban II Context, EUR. COMIv'N, http://ec.europa.eu/regional policy/urban2/
intro-en.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2011) (explaining that the Framework for Action for
Sustainable Urban Development adopted by the Commission in 1998 "recognises the importance
of the urban dimension in Community policies, and highlights in particular the possibilities
offered by the regional development programmes").
15. J.H.H. Weiler's The Transformation ofEurope emphasized the role of Member State's
executives and the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In Weiler's account, the transformation of
Europe was a reverse of the classic examples of regions empowered through decentralization in
Italy, Spain, and France. The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) brought to the surface the unstable
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commentators noted that the endogenous analysis of the "Transformation
of Europe," as described by Joseph H. Weiler, omitted the behavior of
national bureaucracies and domestic courts, oscillating from resisting to
endorsing European integration." In addition, regional policy was at the
margin of European integration, especially for lawyers for whom
"cohesion is still strikingly minor in judicial discourse."
By the 1990s, the EU was in a desperate search for solutions to
solve its democratic deficit and increase the effectiveness of its
legislation." Brussels launched institutional reforms to reach local
communities while scholars wrote about the need for greater local
participation in EU decision-making processes to improve their "input
legitimacy." Political scientists and lawyers aimed to connect local
communities more explicitly to Brussels." Subnational actors would no
longer be invisible, but rather would be active participants in setting the
Commission's legislative agenda and in implementing European
Community (EC) policies. Regional governments became important
interlocutors with Brussels through bodies such as the Assembly of
European Regions, aiming at cooperating with the EU on development
projects.20 Soon after, not only regions, but also cities, organized several
lobbying groups to become the interlocutors with the EU.2 Because
compromises of the single market and the democratic deficit whereby local governments
reclaimed a loss of direct democracy in Europe. Weiler, supo note 9, at 2470.
16. See Henry Schermers, Comment on Welerk The Transformation of Europe, 100
YALE L.J. 2525 (1990-199 1); Philip Allott, The European Community Is Not the True European
Community, 100 YALE L.J. 2485 (1990-1991).
17. See Daniela Caruso, Dhect Concern in Regional Policy: The European Court of
Justice and the Southern Question, 17 EuR. L.J. 804 (2011).
18. The most common form of EU legislation is a directive that seeks to harmonize
national legal regimes in a particular field. A directive is adopted by the Council and the
European Parliament (EP) and proposed by the Commission according to article 294 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the codecision procedure.
Directives need to be transposed by the Member States into their national legal orders within two
years to become fully effective. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 294, Sept. 5, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
19. See THE REGIONS AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (Robert Leonardi ed., 1993);
Joanne Scott, Regional Policy: An Evolutionary Perspective, in THE EvOLUTION OF EU LAW 625
(Paul Craig & Grdinne de B(irca eds., 1999).
20. The Assembly of European Regions was created in 1985 as an interlocutor for the
regions with Brussels; today its NGOs represent over 300 regions in the EU and beyond, and
lobby the European Parliament in Strasbourg. History of the Assembly of European Regions,
ASSEMBLY OF EUR. REGIONS, http://www.aer.eu/about-aer/history/history-of-the-aer.html (last
visited Sept. 2, 2011).
21. For instance, municipalities started early on to lobby Brussels in various forms, and in
the mid-1980s, EUROCITIES represented a network of six main cities in Europe aiming to
collaborate with the Commission on local projects. See About Us EUROCITIES, http://www.
eurocities.eu/contentlabout/content.php (last visited Sept. 2, 2011).
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cities have tremendous symbolic power in the European imagination,22
the EU Council has enlisted cities as the key actors for integration,
development, and sustainability in the Leipzig Charter.23
Today the EU decentralization rhetoric lumps together a number of
very different subnational actors such as metropolitan areas, towns,
neighborhoods, and districts as well as regions, provinces, and cities in
the homogeneous category of "third level Europe."24  Even though it
might sound paradoxical, this attempt to decentralize power by the EU
serves centralization purposes in the construction of a European
identity.25  In adopting Richard Ford's insight, consolidation and
centralization are not antithetical but rather they encompass jurisdictional
subdivisions and differentiation. In Ford's words, "[T]erritorial power is
exercised not only through repression or exclusion of difference and
centralization, not only through homogenization or assimilation to a
mean, but also through the production of difference."26 Thus, the
lumping rhetoric creates local differentiation in European integration
which allows Brussels to address local autonomy and decentralization.
At the same time, however, this Article argues that the "third level
Europe" rhetoric conceals how supranational and state background rules
structure the power of local actors to cooperate, resist, or trigger new
conflicts in their interaction with their national governments and the EU.27
The lessons learned from the problems arising in EU cohesion policy are
valuable for other central regulatory areas in the EU where there is a
22. For an example of the city-state, see MARIO ASCHIERI, LE CITrA-STATO (2006). For
an example of the cities in the Holy Roman Empire, see JOHANNES ALTHusius, POLITICA
METHODICE DIGESTA OF JOHANNES ALTHUSius (reprt. 1979). Cities have a symbolic power in
Western consciousness, which derives from the way the history and the geography of cities have
shaped human relations over time. In particular, cities were at the center of the industrial
revolution; urban rather than rural areas were where the economy has flourished in modern times.
See FERNAND BRAUDEL, A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATIONS (Richard Maune trans., Penguin Press
1994) (1987). Second, there is a sociological understanding of the city as a longstanding example
of a democratic association organizing the social and economic life of different groups of
individuals in an urban space. See PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE SOCIAL STRUCTURES OF THE ECONOMY
12-13 (Chris Turner trans., 2005); A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE (Philippe Aribs & Georges Duby
eds., 1987); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 1212, 1236 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., 1968). Finally, the aspect of the city that is relevant for this Article is the legal one, namely
how the law shapes and in turn is shaped by the economic and democratic choices made by local
governments. See Frug, supra note 11, at 254.
23. See Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (EC), May 24, 2007, available at
http://www.eu2007.de/en/News/download docs/Mai/0524-AN/075DokumentLeipzigCharta.pdf.
24. See URBACT II: OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME CALL FOR PROPOSAL FOR THE CREATION
OF A WORKING GROUP ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEIPZIG CHARTER 7-8 (2009).
25. See Ford, supra note 10.
26. Id. at 906.
27. For a definition of city structures, see FRUG & BARRON, supra note 5, at 3.
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need for Brussels to cooperate with local actors in implementing EU law
and policy. A better understanding of local heterogeneity and
socioeconomic disparities within each Member State is central to
improving EU Regulatory strategies for development as well as
environmental or competition policies.
A. The Treaty ofLisbon Reforms Enhance LocalAutonomy
The European commitment to decentralization and local autonomy
was an important way to respond to the quests for greater legitimacy of
supranational legislation and the democratic deficit sweeping the EC in
the late 1980s." The strategy of linking local communities to Brussels
goes hand in hand with the expansion of EU competences and the
completion of the establishment of a single market.29 Despite the efforts
by Brussels to include regions-and in ancillary ways other subnational
actors such as cities and provinces in Community decision-making
processes-the role for subnational actors was rather limited in many
aspects. The Treaty of Lisbon architecture has created new possibilities
to strengthen the principle of subsidiarity while opening new judicial
avenues for the CoR, an assembly representing "third level Europe" in
Brussels on behalf of localities. These new avenues for local actors to
improve the "input legitimacy" of EC policies might change some of the
dynamics between the regions and Brussels with respect to the
implementation and the justiciability of EU cohesion policy.
1. The Local Dimension of the Subsidiarity Principle
Since the mid-1980s, decentralization was functional to European
integration insofar as it responded to the demands of increasing the
legitimacy and participation of local actors in supranational decision-
making processes. 0 The involvement of local actors was a way through
28. The lack of local participation in EU policies created several tensions in European
governance that commentators addressed as the well-known problem of "democratic deficit." For
a lack of input democracy and lack of European political debate, see Scharpf, supm note 1, at
323.
29. The Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 tipped the balance in favor of decentralization of
power while seeking to achieve more legitimacy for the EU and expanded competences to
regulate social aspects of the common market (environment, education, consumer, etc.). The
European Community became the EU with the Treaty of Maastricht. This was committed to
decentralization and it established the Committee of the Regions in articles 305-307 of the EC
Treaty. TFEU arts. 305-307.
30. See SCHMIDT, supra note 4, at 158 (showing how the effects of EU decentralization
reforms and their benefits for local governments ought to be analyzed field by field and with
particular attention to the different internal allocations of powers in each Member State).
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which the Commission sought a more successful implementation of its
legislative and policy initiatives, especially in regulating the social
aspects of the single market." For instance, EU directives in the
environmental field often covered subjects that in certain Member States
belonged to the competence of Liinder, regional, and local governments.
As a result, subnational governments were compelled to develop
strategies to protect their competences and resist the harmonization
process.
Because of the resistance and the lobbying of subnational actors, the
Treaty of Maastricht (1992) set up some political safeguards for local
power against centralization.32 The principle of subsidiarity incorporated
into the Treaty aimed at protecting local powers in those areas where the
Union shared its competence with the Member States." When compared
to the United States, George Bermann pointed out that in the EU, there is
no need for judicial intervention in policing federal boundaries because
the political safeguards of federalism have been proceduralized by the
Treaty.34 According to Bermann this shift from jurisdictional to
procedural approaches created a unique mechanism for national and
local political control of the EU legislature." As Florian Sander elegantly
31. As the Community competences expanded so that Brussels could legislate over
economic as well as social matters, the conflicts over EU versus Member States or even local
competences were increasingly likely to happen. Despite the formal recognition of the limited
legislative competences of the Community legislature on social matters, the increasing number of
shared competences between the states and the Union began intensifying the reach of EU law and
policy to what in many states are exclusive local competences. Similar to the federal conflicts
that arise in United States on federal preemption and commandeering, these also emerged in the
EU with the problematic enforcement of directives. These issues are more thoroughly addressed
below. See Halberstam, supra note 6; see also inlr Part II.
32. See Robert Schtitze, Subsidiarity after Lisbon: Reinforcing the Safeguards of
Federalism?, 68 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 525, 526 (2009).
33. With the constitutionalization of the principle of subsidiarity, first inserted in Single
European Act (1986) and the creation of European citizenship in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992),
supranational institutions such as the Commission and the European Parliament became more
receptive to democratic concerns and in particular to greater decentralization demands. The
Treaty also used a procedural approach to determine issues of subsidiarity, rather than substantive
criteria. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 5, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1
[hereinafter EC Treaty] ("In areas which do not fall within its exclusive Competence, the
Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far
as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and
can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the
Community.").
34. See George Bermann, National Parliaments and Subsidiaty: An Outsiderk View, 4
EuR. CoNsT. L. REv. 453,454 (2008).
35. In the United States, the traditional political safeguards of federalism are inherent in
the Senate's role, even though such a role has been long discredited. On the other hand, the
federalist revival of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts has played a key role in policing federal
power and reasserting state and local autonomy vis-A-vis Congress. In explaining the differences
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explained, the EU system differs from the United States insofar as the
subsidiarity principle creates a "second layer" of competences.36 Article
5(2) of the Treaty of Maastricht defined subsidiarity by assessing the
correct allocation of powers between the EU and the Member States
through the concept of the "appropriateness of decision-making.""
Subsidiarity meant that in the realm of shared or nonexclusive
competences, the EU could regulate only those matters that could not be
achieved by Member States' action.
The Subsidiarity Protocol in the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997)
amended by the Convention Draft envisaged two main avenues of
reform, a legislative and a judicial one." With respect to the new judicial
safeguards, the Protocol introduced a more explicit subsidiarity approach
by requesting that the Commission forward its bills both to national
parliaments and to supranational institutions." These bills should
"contain some assessment of the proposal's financial impact" by
justifying the reason why the objective is better achieved at the Union
level, using qualitative and quantitative indicators.40 With respect to the
judicial avenue, the Protocol grants the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
jurisdiction to decide cases based on infringement of the subsidiarity
principle.4' The innovation is that national parliamentary chambers as
between EU and U.S. federal arrangements, George Bermann has sharply pointed out in the
United States there is no working definition of federalism but rather "merely a generalized
sense-even an intuition-as to the matters that are somehow, by their nature, inherently 'local'
and those that are not. In place of what Europeans can present as a 'subsidiarity analysis', we
have only a 'federalism impulse' to offer." See id at 454.
36. The first layer of EU legislative competence is the authority to adopt legislation in
order to attain specific goals. A second layer of EU competences creates limits "within the
existing framework of delegated legislative empowerment." See Florian Sander, Subsidiarity
Infringements Before the European Court of Justice: Futile Interference with Politics or a
Substantial Step Towards Federalism? 12 COLUM. J.I EuR. L. 517, 527 (2006).
37. See EC Treaty art. 5(2); Grbinne de Burca, Reappraising Subsidiarityr Significance
afterAmsterdam (Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/99, 2000), available at http://www.jean
monnetprogram.org/papers/99/990701.rtf (explaining that there is both a process and an
outcome-oriented question beyond the notion of appropriateness of decision making); Margherita
Poto, Democracy andEurope: New Times, Old Dilemmas, 13 EuR. PUB. L. 633 (2007); Costas
Kombos, Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Freedoms: A Symbiosis on the Basis of
Subsidiarity, 12 EUR. PUB. L. 433 (2006).
38. See Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality
art. 1, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 207 (EU) ("Each institution shall ensure constant respect for the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality."). More recently, the Treaty of Lisbon (2007) has
incorporated these two reform proposals to address the structural inadequacies of the subsidiarity
principle.
39. Id art. 4.
40. Id art. 5.
41. Id. art. 8.
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well as the CoR are entitled, along with the Member States, to bring such
complaints before the ECJ.
The Treaty of Lisbon is more attentive to a local dimension in its
article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) providing that "the
Union shall respect the equality of the Member States before the Treaties
as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local
self-government."4 2 In addition, the subsidiarity principle, as reframed by
the Treaty of Lisbon, is increasingly an important legal tool for
subnational actors.43 While previously the subsidiarity principle was
limited to the Member States, the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly mentions
regional and local levels of government in article 5(3) TEU where "the
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at
central or at regional and local level""
With Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Subsidiarity
Principle, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces an early monitoring system
that empowers national parliaments to send the Commission a reasoned
opinion on the compliance of legislative proposals with the subsidiarity
principle.45 Finally, the Protocol creates an ex-post control through a new
form of judicial review by the European Court based on a subsidiarity
action.4
42. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union art. 4(2), Sept. 5, 2008, 2008
O.J. (C 115) 47 [hereinafter TEU] (emphasis added).
43. In the current system, local and regional governments can bring subsidiarity claims
before the ECJ to challenge Community acts that impinge upon a sphere of exclusive national
power only if they are supported by the Member States. See N.W Barber, Subsidiarity in the
DraA Constitution, 11 EUR. PUn. L. 197 (2005); see also Case C-97/95, R6gion Wallonne v.
Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1789 (limiting both standing and responsibility in regions); Case C-
180/97, Regione Toscana v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5247 (same).
44. EC Treaty art. 5(3) (emphasis added).
45. See Paul Craig, The Treaty ofLisbon, Process, Architecture and Substance, 33 EUR.
L. REv. 137, 150 (2008). The criteria to assess the infringement of subsidiarity by the
Commission are described by the Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity
and Proportionality that sets in place the compliance-monitoring system. Within eight weeks of
when the Commission transmits to the national assemblies a legislative act, these criteria can give
reasoned opinions for noncompliance with the principle of subsidiarity. For a detailed analysis of
the Protocol, see Gavin Barrett, "The King Is Dead Long Live the King" The Recasting by the
Treaty of Lisbon of the Provisions of the Constitutional Treaty Concerning National Parliaments,
33 EUR. L. REv. 66, 73 (2008).
46. See Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
supra note 38, art. 8 ("The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction in
actions on grounds of infringement of the principle of subsidiarity by a European legislative act,
brought in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 111-365 of the Constitution by Member
States, or notified by them in accordance with their legal order on behalf of their national
Parliament or a chamber of it. In accordance with the rules laid down in the said Article, the
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Scholars have commented on these new checks on EU legislation as
new safeguards of federalism, or as Robert Schiitze put it, as a "soft
constitutional solution" channeling the scrutiny of national parliaments.47
In fact, the early monitoring system allows national parliaments to
monitor whether the EU can better achieve a policy objective than the
Member States or their subnational actors.48 In drafting its bills, the
Commission should adopt an objective "efficiency calculus" including
both quantitative and qualitative indicators to demonstrate that the
economic and social impact of its proposals creates an incentive to carry
out the action at the EU rather than at the state or local level.49 Then
national parliaments, within a limited time, can raise a subsidiarity
warning without any binding effects unless at least one-third of national
parliaments raise subsidiarity warnings for a bill."
This early monitoring mechanism is a political safeguard that
involves national parliaments in an ex-ante check on subsidiarity."
Because of the high number of bills drafted by the Commission and the
strict deadline for national assemblies, scholars have pointed out the little
weight that national parliaments have in this process. In addition, there is
a salient collective action problem in organizing the different national
parliaments to achieve the quorum needed for a formal review of the
bills.52
As to the ex-post check on subsidiarity, the CoR will be able to
challenge EU legislation when there is a subsidiarity breach before the
ECJ." In doing so, the CoR can defend its own consultative powers by
challenging supranational institutions that did not take its advice into
consideration.54 Another element of this ex-post control on subsidiarity is
Committee of the Regions may also bring such actions against European legislative acts for the
adoption of which the Constitution provides that it be consulted.").
47. See Schatze, supm note 32, at 531; Brendan Flynn, Reformed Subsidiarity M the
Constitution for Europe: Can It Deliver Its Expectations? (EIPA Working Paper No. 7/W/2005,
2005), available athttp://aei.pitt.edu/5916/; Ian Cooper, The Watchdogs ofSubsdianty: National
Parliaments and the Logic ofArguing h1the EU 44 J. COMMON MKT. STuD. 281 (2006).
48. See Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
supra note 38, art. 5 (requiring the Commission to undertake a comparative efficiency calculus).
49. See Barrett, supra note 45, at 80 (discussing the difficulty to block legislation due to
the high quorum requested by article 7(3), both in the Parliament and in the Council).
50. See Protocol on the Application of the Principles Subsidiarity and Proportionality,
supm note 38, arts. 6-7.
51. See Berman, supa note 34, at 458.
52. Seeid. at 458-59.
53. This new power for the CoR also creates an alternative forum to the national
parliaments for local governments concerned with subsidiarity violations.
54. See Press Release, Committee of the Regions, European Court of Justice Judge Koen
Lenaerts Calls on CoR and Legislative Regions To Prepare for Greater Powers Under the Lisbon
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that any national parliamentary chamber is entitled to start an action
before the ECJ. In the case of Germany this means that both chambers,
the Bundestag, the assembly representing the people, and the Bundesrat,
the council representing the LAlder, could "independently lodge an
action for annulment."" Commentators have speculated on the inter-
pretation of the subsidiarity principle, especially in a transatlantic
conversation as influenced by the US. experience, scholars have called it
a "presumption against pre-emption."" A new floodgate of litigation,
however, using the new judicial avenue to police subsidiarity violations
before the Luxembourg courts is unlikely due to what seems a fairly clear
allocation of powers between the EU and its Member States in the post-
Lisbon architecture.
These new subsidiarity procedures have sparked new hopes about
decentralization and "input legitimacy" by subnational actors in the EU
democratic architecture. The mechanisms just described are geared to
make the subsidiarity principle more effective. Nevertheless, these
checks and monitoring mechanisms only apply in the realm of shared
competences between the Union and its Member States. Subsidiarity
checks are excluded for those areas that fall into the exclusive
competence of the EU, such as matters concerning custom unions,
competition, and monetary policy. They will apply, however, to broad
matters including common market, consumer protection, energy,
cohesion, and environmental policy, and the proportionality analysis is
most likely to remain at the core of the infringement claim."
2. Reforming the Committee of the Regions
During the mid-1980s, the project undertaken by the Delors
Commission of achieving a single market for free movement of goods,
services, capital, and workers created large democratic and social
Treaty (May 20, 2005), http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/PressTemplate.aspx?view--detail&id=
19030f50-2166-49f7-ade6-2afD5d451234. As Professor Judge Koen Lenaerts, also a judge of the
European Court of Justice put it:
This means that the Committee of the Regions, even if it remains a consultative body,
will considerably gain in importance. The consultative right means that the legislative
institutions will have to inform the CoR about the reasons why they did not follow a
CoR proposal and, most importantly, the Committee of the Regions will have the right
to ask to be re-consulted if an initial legislative proposal on which the CoR had given
its opinion is substantially modified during the legislative process.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. See Hans Jilrgen Papier, Europek New Realism: The Treaty of Lisbon, 4 EUR.
CONST. L. Rcv. 421 (2008).
56. See Schiitze, supra note 32, at 533; Young, supm note 6.
57. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAw 100 (5th ed. 2011).
77
TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP. LAW
tensions. In this period, policy makers were more willing to
acknowledge the "role of local groups in satisfying deeply felt needs for
group identity and dignity."" Decentralization advocates suggested that
an increase in regional and local autonomy could offer a solution to
cultural and territorial conflicts." The shared belief was that subnational
participation in EU decision-making processes would solve the
longstanding democratic deficit by matching the concomitant
accountability of supranational institutions in Brussels. The shift towards
regionalization was simultaneous with the expansion of EU competences
beyond merely economic matters." The creation of a European identity
"united in diversity" was based on the affirmation of local diversities
sharing a similar cultural and political identity."
The creation of the CoR aimed to give voice to local actors through
their democratic representation in Brussels.62 Its creation in the early
1990s was a landmark event, representing Europe's commitment to, and
recognition of, subnational interests. The CoR, an organic institution
representing a plethora of different subnational actors in their demands
for local autonomy, was Brussels' response to local resistance in
enforcing EC directives. The CoR was one of the many responses to the
democratic deficit in the EU." Decentralization advocates believed that
increasing the mandatory consultation of the CoR would strengthen the
role of subnational actors, especially in areas such as EU cohesion policy,
while legitimizing supranational processes." Some expected the CoR to
5 8. Id.
59. Jordi Pujol, President of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia, stated that
"regionalization is the answer to the need for citizens to express their identities within the
European mosaic." Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Committee of the Regions and the Role of
Regional Governments in the European Union, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 413, 418
(1996-1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. See SOCIAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE (Grninne de Biirca & Bruno de Witte eds., 2005).
61. "United in Diversity" was introduced in the Preamble of the Treaty of Maastricht and
became the EU motto. See United i Diversity, supra note 2.
62. See Committee oftheRegions, EuR. COMM'N, http://www.cor.europa.eu/pages/Home
Template.aspx (follow "Presentation" hyperlink; then follow "Role" hyperlink) (last visited Sept.
21, 2011) (providing a timeline for the CoR).
63. See Ford, supa note 10, at 862.
64. See Roht-Arriaza, supm note 59, at 446.
65. See What Model for the Committee of the Regions? Past Experiences and Future
Perspectives (Eur. Univ. Inst. Working Paper EUF No. 95/2, Renaud Dehousse & Thomas
Christiansen eds., 1995); ALEX WARLEIGH, THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS: INSTITUTIONALISING
MuLTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE? (1999).
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mature into a full-fledged legislative chamber, alongside the European
Parliament (EP) and the Council."
Supranational institutions such as the Commission and the EP were
ambivalent advocates for regional cooperation and cohesion policy
through the CoR. The Commission needs to consult with regional and
local representatives to succeed in the implementation of its legislative
bills as well as disbursement of EU funds. For this task, however, the
Commission would have preferred to involve an adjunct advisory body
on regional policy rather than another fully independent supranational
institution." Today the Commission is bound to consult the CoR in areas
in which its legislative initiatives are directly relevant to the territories in
question."
Likewise, the EP did not initially support a possible competitor
insofar as the CoR Assembly, formed by elected subnational govern-
ments' officials, aimed to connect Brussels to local territories in a similar
way to the EP" The CoR Assembly was meant to be a forum in which
subnational actors were entitled to express their views on the future
impact of the policies elaborated in Brussels."
Despite the initial resistance of the Member States, they became the
most important advocates of the creation of the CoR as an independent
supranational institution." By controlling its membership, the Member
States sought a way to advance their national interests through the CoR.72
Member States with strong subnational actors like the German Lirder
lobbied in favor of the creation of the CoR, in which local authorities
could express their voice on EC decision-making processes." The
66. See Thomas Christiansen & Pamela Lintner, The Committee of the Regions After 10
Years: Lessons from the Past and Challenges of the Future I EIPA (Dec. 2, 2004), http://www.
eipa.eu/files/repository/eipascope/scopO5_I_2.pdf.
67. See Tony Cole, The Committee of the Regions and Subnational Representation to the
European Union, 12 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 49, 55 (2005).
68. Id at 54-55; see also THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS
A THIRD LEVEL EUROPE?, supra note 3.
69. See Resolution on the Intergovernmental Conference Decided on at the European
Council in Madrid, Nov. 23, 1989, at 7, reprinted in RICHARD CORBETT, THE TREATY OF
MAASTRICHT: FROM CONCEPTION TO RATIFICATION 104 (1993) (calling on Member States to
"ensure that the construction of the European Union goes hand-in-hand with a strengthening of
regional autonomy according to the principle of subsidiarity").
70. See European Commission Communication on Dialogue with Associations of
Regional and LocalAuthoties on the Formulation ofEuropean Union Policy, at 1, COM (2003)
811 final (Dec. 19, 2003) (laying down the framework, goals, and modalities governing this
dialogue with associations of regional and local authorities).
71. See Cole, supra note 67, at 56.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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composition of the CoR reflects the intense lobbying activity of the
Member States.74
Today the CoR has 344 members elected for four years from the
representatives of regional and local bodies." Each Member State is
entitled to a certain number of representatives regardless of the type of
decentralization existing at the domestic level." Because of the large
number of subnational representatives in each state, these representatives
are selected by the national governments." This selection is problematic
because national authorities tend to choose those regional and local
representatives that support the central government."
The CoR activities generally consist of consultation and issuing
nonbinding opinions to the other supranational institutions. In some
areas such as education (article 165(2) TFEU), culture (article 167(5)
TFEU), and especially economic and social cohesion (article 178 TFEU),
its advisory views are mandatory, when concerning matters in which the
EU has not exclusive but shared competences with the Member States.79
However, the Commission, the Council, and the EP are obliged to consult
the CoR when taking action on specific social welfare matters.o The
CoR opinions on the Commission's policy proposals are submitted either
at its discretion or at the request of the Commission. The CoR publishes
an "Impact Assessment Report" every six months stating the political
74. Id
75. On the CoR membership, see TEC art. 3 (determining that the number of members
allowed by each country is based on GDP, population, and their political weight).
76. Id.
77. Id
78. As Cole puts it, "even though the treaty provisions covering the CoR explicitly
guarantee the autonomy of the CoR Members, the selection process itself ensures that this is a
goal unlikely to be met." See Cole, supra note 67, at 60 (explaining that because reelection after
four years must be approved by the national governments, this limits the ability of the subnational
representatives to speak freely against their states).
79. See DAMIAN CHALMERS & ADAM ToMKINS, EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIc LAW 90 (2d ed.
2011). This distinction between matters of local interest (police powers and social policy) versus
matters of European interest (customs union and competition), which is strictly connected to the
competences assigned by the Treaty to each sphere of power, has marked the nature of the CoR.
80. These matters include education and youth, culture, public health, trans-European
cultural networks and economic and social cohesion. The mandatory consultation of the CoR is
required before making a decision on the following matters (and their respective articles under the
EC Treaty): education, vocational training and youth [article 149 (126)]; culture [article 151
(128)]; public health [article 152 (129)]; trans-European transport, telecommunications and
energy networks [article 156 (129d)]; economic and social cohesion: specific actions [article 159
(130b)]; defining the tasks, priorities and organization of the Structural Funds [article 161
(130d)]; implementing decisions relating to the European Regional Development Fund [article
162 (130e)]. See European Parliament Fact Sheets, EUR. COMM'N, http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/factsheets/13_12 en.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
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achievements, the impact of its opinions, and the related activities to
demonstrate the salience of its activities."
Because of the large number of representatives, the formation of
CoR opinions does not involve the entire Assembly in its plenary
session.82 The Assembly only votes, through simple majority, for the
adoption of the CoR opinions." The opinions are elaborated and drafted
by a very limited number of members that include the President and a
Bureau of about sixty members elected every two-and-a-half years.' The
Bureau constitutes the elite involved in drafting the CoR opinions."
While the discussion of the opinions takes place in the different
committees created within the Bureau, only the Plenary Assembly votes
on them." As Tony Cole pointed out, this decision-making process
undermines the possibility that the entire Assembly could have an
influence on the CoR opinions."
Today the CoR is a well-respected consultative body among the
other supranational institutions for its expertise on local matters and
regional or cohesion policy. The Commission regularly involves and
consults the CoR regarding regional interests in an attempt to better
implement its policies as a sort of ex ante mechanism to check on the
future implementation of its bills and development strategies. The CoR
was proven to be a successful forum to share information about the
implementation of EU legislation at the local level. Fruitful
conversations with new Member States that had a previous familiarity
with the CoR took place right before the European enlargement. After
the EU enlargement with ten new Member States in 2004, the CoR
successfully managed the tensions of the accession procedures by
serving as a forum for discussions and cooperation between regional
authorities of current Member States, as well as between those of newly
joining Member States and the candidate countries."
81. See CoR Impact Assessment Report 2004, EUR. COMM'N (Apr. 12, 2005), http://
www.cor.europa.eu/COR-cms/ui/ViewDocument.aspx?siteid-default&contentlD-=3583c3bc-4a08-
449f-987e-06836ef01475.
82. Cole, supa note 67, at 63.
83. Id.
84. See id For the functioning of the bureau, see Presentation/Bureau; EUR. COMM'N,
http://cor.europa.eu/pages/PresentationTemplate.aspx?view-folder&id=d0808c8c-0d54-4f66-8fc2-
Oeed6O 1 ddc78&sm=d0808c8c-0d54-4f66-8fc2-Oeed6O ddc78 (last visited Mar. 10, 2009).
85. Presentation/Bureau, supra note 84.
86. Id.
87. See Cole, supra note 67, at 67.
88. Christiansen & Lintner, supm note 66, at 5; see also Breffni O'Rourke, Europe:
Preserving Cultural Identity with Globalization, RADIO FREE EUR. (Mar. 13, 2002), http://ins
news.org/world/focus/0302/europe.intergration.culture.htm. Today, with the new trend in EU
foreign policy, the accession of new Member States is unlikely to happen. Rather, the new
81
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Critics, however, have pointed to the CoR's limited consultative role
despite its broad power to deliver opinions on a large variety of topics."
Often the CoR's qualitative contribution to the EC decision-making
process is likely to be shallow and unfocused, thus having little impact on
other supranational institutions.90 Despite the prosperous activity of the
CoR in its initial years, this institution has since not played a crucial role
in the EC decision-making process. For instance, because it has an
advisory role with no enforcement power, one could argue the CoR
ended up paying lip service to democratic concerns rather than having a
substantive input in decision-making processes.
From the outset, the CoR had an "unclear founding purpose, with
the Commission wanting on the ground expertise from within the
Member States to implement regional policy, and the German Uinder
and some others [wanting] an institution with a genuinely representative
function."" As a consequence, representation of subnational authorities
within the CoR is very diverse. The CoR's diverse membership includes
representatives from multiple European local governments, including
regions, provinces, and cities.92 Not surprisingly, the authors of the report
considered territorial diversity one of the main reasons for discord and
division." Territorial diversity heightened deep cultural and economic
cleavages that can have a detrimental effect on cohesion policy
initiatives. The CoR opinion regarding the Commission's development
often depends on the impact that such proposals will have on different
territories. Such an impact tends to fracture the CoR constituencies
between urban and rural areas, between northern and southern, and
eastern and western territories.9" New divisions have risen within the
CoR that entail not only the classic geographic divisions just mentioned,
Neighborhood Policy, converging both cooperation and security matters between the EU and the
countries on its eastern borders, creates a new scenario for the CoR in its cooperation activities.
See Steven Blockmans & Adam Lazowski, The European Union and Its Neighbours:
Questioning Identity andRelationshis, hi THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS NEIGHBOURS: A LEGAL
APPRAISAL OF THE EU's POLICIES OF STABILISATION, PARTNERSHIP AND INTEGRATION 3, 7-8
(Steven Blockmans & Adam Lazowski eds., 2006); Tamara Takics, Book Review, 44 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 852-54 (2007).
89. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 59, at 453.
90. See id. at 453-54.
9 1. See Charlie Jeffery, Regions and the European Union: Letting Them in, and Leaving
Them Alone, in THE ROLE OF REGIONS AND SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS IN EUROPE 33, 36 (Stephen
Weatherill & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2005).
92. Id.
93. See Peter van der Knaap, The Committee of the Regions: The Outset ofa 'Europe of
Regions'., 4 REGIONAL FED. STUD. 86 (1994).
94. Id. (explaining how Northern regions have been perceiving too much clientelism in
the Southern style of local politics).
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but also local competitiveness between cities and regions over European
resources and opposing local goals with regards to the implementation of
EU directives. In other words, rather than bridging political and
geographical rifts, the CoR has heightened territorial tensions."
After 2004, the date of the major EU enlargement towards the east
with the accession of ten new Member States, the CoR membership
expanded from 222 to 317 members. At this point, another tension
pervaded the CoR, triggered by the socioeconomic diversity as well as
the different approach to decentralization in former Communist
republics. Some feared that the new members might have different
political views and a territorial agenda that could upset the balance
reached in the CoR." Overall, the inherent composition of the CoR itself
created national divisions or transnational sub-divisions based on
territorial as well as political party lines.97 As a result, these emerging
cleavages have prevented the CoR "from developing the kind of
consensualism that was initially expected from it, given the discourse of a
'Europe of the Regions."'9
A report reflecting on the successes and shortcomings of the CoR
ten years after its creation asked whether the original expectations for the
CoR had been satisfied.99 The report suggested that the CoR sought to
become a legislative chamber alongside the European Parliament.'oo The
authors revealed some of the factors that they believed may have
prevented the CoR from reaching its full potential."' These included the
unclear and vague goals set up for the CoR, as well as the diverse
membership and ultimately the territorial diversity among its members.'02
Proposals to reform the CoR in the Constitutional Treaty have varied
from organizing subnational entities along local party lines to creating a
double chamber (one for the regions and the other for the cities) to
changing the system of selection of representatives, which is largely
95. See John Loughlin & Daniel-L. Seiler, Le Comitd des Rdgions et la supranationalt
en Europe, 30 REVUE ETUDES INTERNATIONALEs 763, 774 (1999).
96. However, this factor appeared unfounded according to a study of the post-
enlargement effects on localities in which the CoR suggested that the sudden increase of new
members did not significantly alter the operation of the CoR. See John A. Scherpereel,
Absorbing the Shock: Enlargement's Effects on the Committee of the Region 23 (Mar. 2005)
(unpublished manuscript), http://aei.pitt.edu/3303/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
97. See Van der Knaap, supra note 93.
98. Id.
99. Christiansen & Lintner, supra note 66, at 7.
100. Id 10.
101. Id. at 7-8.
102. Id. at 8.
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based on national quotas based on the population of the Member
States.o3
Finally, the CoR reflects the understanding of a "third level Europe"
because subnational interests are depicted coherently and organically
aiming at similar local autonomy goals. The way the CoR is structured
presupposes homogeneity among local actors and a communality of
interests that should be effectively represented in its Assembly.'" These
win-win situations are exemplary of an institution committed to enlisting
localities to subscribe to the goals of the EU while providing a
participation platform for local governments. The CoR promotes an
organic understanding of what is "local" so that Brussels can emphasize
and define local identities for its regions, cities, and provinces in order to
adopt coherent and decontextualized cohesion policies based on the
notion of local autonomy and a "third level Europe."'05
B. ScholarlyApproaches to LocalAutonomyib the EU
1. More Visibility to Local and Regional Actors in the EU
Scholars who have criticized the EU because it is pervaded by a
regional blindness more or less have implicitly promoted a unity vision.
They contend that the current constitutional arrangement of the EU does
not take into account the internal systems of decentralization of power
within each Member State.' 6 They propose reforming the CoR to
provide better local participation and ameliorating subsidiarity
procedures for local governments.'" Professor Stephen Weatherill
describes regional blindness as a pervasive disease spreading through
Europe that reveals itself by challenging the current patterns of EU law."00
Thus, regional blindness critics protest against the limited power that
103. See Jeffery, supra note 91, at 44-45.
104. See Rosarie E. McCarthy, The Committee of the Regions: An Advisory Bodyk
Tortuous Path to Influence, 4 J. EuR. PUB. Pol'Y 439 (1997) (noting that a deep crisis pervaded
the CoR all through the late 1990s).
105. In doing so, Brussels is ignoring how the different political powers of the German
Ldander, the Italian regions and the Greek prefectures or cities are shaped by the different internal
constitutional regimes as well as by the intranational power differences affecting local actors. For
a study on the relation between the center and the peripheries in Europe, see STEIN ROKKAN &
DEREK W URWIN, ECONOMY, TERRITORY, IDENTITY POLITICS OF WEST EUROPEAN PERIPHERIES
(1983); PROTECTING THE PERIPHERY: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN PERIPHERAL REGIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION (Susan Bauer et al. eds., 1994).
106. See Stephen Weatherill, The Challenge of the Regional Dimension in the European
Union, inTHE ROLE OF REGIONS AND SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS IN EUROPE 1, 7-8 (Steven Weatherill
& Ulf Bernitz eds., 2005).
107. Id at 7-8.
108. Id. at 5.
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localities have in the EU and argue that the subsidiarity principle is
inadequate to offer a real cure to the lack of decentralization.'o
According to these scholars, a broader institutional reform project at the
Union level should give subnational entities more power in two respects.
On the one hand, Weatherill suggests strengthening input legitimacy
through a more "direct access to the EC law-making process," while on
the other he proposes a greater possibility to challenge the validity of acts
before European courts."'
This twofold strategy is a remedy to what critics of regional
blindness see as a paradox of European integration, whereby the law is
made with little participation by subnational actors while local
governments are crucial actors in implementing EU directives. Even if
local governments refuse to implement directives, Member States bear
the responsibility before the Commission and ultimately before the
Luxembourg courts. Thus, Member States are trapped between their
internal devolution arrangements and their supranational commitments to
the EU, while subnational actors have little autonomy in the European
architecture."
In undermining the internal distribution and the supranational
allocation of powers that each Member State carefully carved through its
national history, Weatherill warns that the EU empowers national
executives at the expense of subnational authorities."2 According to
Weatherill, soft modes of governance are only a short-term cure to
regional blindness."' A better long-term cure to regional blindness is one
109. See Jeffery, supra note 91.
110. See Weatherill, supra note 106, at 5.
111. A revealing example is the German firefighters case that Weatherill brings as his first
example in which some German Landers do not want to implement the harmonizing directive and
the German government has to respond to the Commission about it. Case C-103/01, Comm'n v.
Germany, 2003 E.C.R. 1-5372; see also Eiko Thielemann, Institutional Limits of a 'Europe with
the Regions': EC State-Aid Control Meets Gernan Federalism, 6 J. EUR. PUB. Pol'Y 399 (1999).
112. See Weatherill, supra note 106, at 7-8 ("This is the price that the EC pays for its
regional-blindness.... Its formal lack of regard for domestic constitutional arrangements may be
combined with activity that in practice severely disturbs those internal patterns. State
responsibility mediated through the EC legal order may encourage trends towards centralisation;
or at least the demands imposed on the State by EC law may impede otherwise significant trends
towards decentralisation.").
113. Id at 9. This short-term solution has some drawbacks. In fact, soft modes of
governance could "store up trouble for the future when there will eventually arrive a reckoning of
the tensions generated by the spread of non-binding activity into potentially constitutionally
unauthorised areas." Id Weatherill points out that in the case of Spain, the open method of
coordination was adopted to sidestep the shortcomings of education policy rather than promote a
radical change. Id.
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that promotes decentralization through political paths to greater
representation of subnational actors at the EU level."'
Critics of regional blindness are committed to reinforcing a
common local identity through which subnational actors can express
themselves and maintain their own distinctiveness at the EU level. In
conveying local governments' representatives such as mayors and
prefects to Brussels, this is per se a transformative process. For local
leaders, "going to Brussels" is synonymous of their becoming more
European, thus strengthening the EU identity in addition to their local
one." 5
Recently, some scholars have advocated in favor of increasing the
standing of regions, particularly in the context of cohesion policy where
the European courts, in striking contrast with other cases in the realm of
state aids, have denied standing to regional actors for the annulment of
EU acts."' Despite the efforts of the Treaty of Lisbon to give greater
access to regional actors, under article 263 TFEU regional actors are not
privileged applicants in challenging the lawfulness of EU acts."7 In
response, Koen Leanerts and Nathan Cambien have explained that even
if the limited standing for the regions remains an obstacle, what is
114. To regional blindness critics, the recognition of differences and the focus on
decentralization can be achieved through supranational legislative and adjudicatory bodies. Thus,
some success stories are possible. According to these scholars, the Aland Islands in Finland have
preserved their local autonomy, not without tensions, but through an alignment of local, national,
and supranational politics promoting decentralization. Id at 9. However, in the post-Treaty of
Lisbon scenario, things have dramatically changed since the Aland Island government refused to
ratify the Treaty, thus creating major diplomatic problems in the negotiations between Finland and
the EU. See SiobhAn Dowling, Ty Aland Islands Threaten To Reject Lisbon Treaty, SPIEGEL
(Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.spiegel.de/international/Europe/0,1518,541281,00.html. Weatherill
contrasted these success stories with situations in which the political alignment is much harder to
reach, and in cases where decentralization involves a large number of regions or it strengthens
deep cultural and socioeconomic dimensions, such as in Spain. Weatherill, supm note 106, at 9.
115. See Peter-Christian Miller-Graff, The German Lander: Involvement h1 EC/EULaw
and Policy Making, in THE ROLE OF REGIONS AND SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS IN EUROPE 103, 113-17
(Stephen Weatherill & Ulf Bernitz eds., 2005). Critics of regional blindness rely on the national-
local structure as embodied in national law rather than envisaging new possibilities for local
power in the EU. Thus the EU has what U.S. local government scholars call a "Hnter v City of
Pittsburgh problem": efforts to protect national power (in the name of decentralization) suggest
that the nation-states should have power to structure sub-national government in their own way.
See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); FRUG & BARRON, supra note 5.
116. For structural funds, see Case T-60/03, Regione Siciliana v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. II-
4142; Case C-15/06 P, Regione Siciliana v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2594; Case T-189/02, Ville
Vesuviane v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-89; Joined Cases C-445/07P and C-455/07P, Comm'n v.
Ville Vesuviane, 2009 E.C.R. 1-7993. For cohesion funds, see Case T-324/06R, Municipio de
Gondomar v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 1-55; Case T-13/08, Koinotita Grammatikou v. Comm'n,
2008 E.C.R. 11-211.
117. SeeTFEU art. 263 (giving only quasi-privileged standing to the CoR when defending
its own prerogatives).
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remarkable is the trajectory of a European jurisprudence much more
attuned to regional autonomy and sensitive to the internal allocation of
power."' In addressing cohesion policy, Anne Thies has clarified the
exceptional approach adopted by the courts vis-d-vis cohesion policy,
thereby denying standing to the regions for lack of direct concern."9 This
is because in challenging a Commission's decision that stops the
disbursement of EU funding, the regions will always attempt to maintain
their economic privileges as the beneficiaries of the funds before the
courts.120  From a more contextual and economic development
perspective concerned with the Southern Italian periphery, Daniela
Caruso advocates giving standing as privileged applicants to the regions
in order to engage the Luxembourg courts more substantively in key
development decisions, too often left to politics rather than law.2' If
these lawyers advocate to improve the representation of regional interests
before the EU courts because this entails important promises for input
legitimacy in Europe, others have elaborated a new governance paradigm
focusing on policy rather than law to better involve local actors in EU
regulatory strategies.
2. New Governance Advocates
There are several historical and intellectual factors that can explain
this shift in vision. Because the possibility of regulating social Europe is
restrained by political, budgetary, and jurisdictional limits, the
Commission began addressing social policies through soft regulatory
tools.'22 A vision of decentralization, aiming at transforming local
jurisdictional lines for pragmatic and instrumental policy outcomes, goes
hand in hand with the new governance shift in the Commission's
regulatory practices.12 At the same time, theories of multilevel
governance and deliberative democracy obtained increasing success
among politicians, technocrats, and lawyers. In the late 1990s, the
growing consensus among scholars and politicians was that the process
118. See Koen Lenaerts & Nathan Cambien, Regions and the European Courts: Giving
Shape to the Regional Dimension ofMember States, 35 EuR. L. REv. 609, 634 (2010).
119. Anne Thies, The Locus Standi of the Regions Before EU Courts, in THE ROLE OF THE
REGIONS IN EU GOVERNANCE 25, 30-34 (Carlos Panara & Alexander DeBecker eds., 2011).
12 0. Id
121. See Daniela Caruso, Direct Concern in Regional Policy: The European Court of
Justice and the Southern Question, (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper No. 10-41, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sOL3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1 710203.
122. See JEAN-CLAUDE BARBIER, LA LONGUE MARCHE VERS L'EUROPE SOCIALE (2008).
123. See Grdinne de Bdrca & Joanne Scott, Introduction: New Governance Law and
Constitutionahsrn, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 1, 2 (Grbinne de B6rca
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
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of creating international law had become a "multilayered process" that
implicitly involved supranational and subnational institutions.124  Gary
Marks defined multilevel governance as "a system of continuous
negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers-
supranational, national, regional, and local." 25 Multilevel governance
influenced lawyers' thinking about decentralization insofar that the focus
on regionalism and localism could justify and give new legitimacy to a
postnational Europe.126
At the same time, Jiirgen Habermas, in his plea for a European
Constitution, recognized the democratic potential for decentralization
through a more substantive role for subnational institutions.127
Deliberative models of democracy would bring, according to the
Habermasian Theory, new legitimacy to representative models.128
Deliberative democratic processes sought to better involve local actors,
civil society, and different stakeholders in consultation processes for the
formation of EU policies. In taking these alternative approaches to
representative democracy seriously through greater participation and
deliberative processes, the aim of the Commission was to bring Brussels
closer to its citizens.129 At this point the combination of multilevel
governance and deliberative democracy became the intellectual
foundations of the community vision.
These intellectual projects played an important role in influencing
EU law in the late 1990s through new governance regulatory tools that
pervaded the Commission's agenda. European politicians, technocrats,
and lawyers began to more explicitly link social policy objectives to
multilevel governance, and deliberative democracy to new governance
124. See Gary Marks, Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC, in 2 THE
STATE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: THE MAASTRICHT DEBATES AND BEYOND 391 (Alan W
Cafruny & Glenda G. Rosenthal eds., 1993).
125. Seeid.at392.
126. See Christian Joerges & Jirgen Neyer, From Intergovernmental Bargaining to
Deliberative Political Processes The Constitutionalisation of Conitology, 3 EUR. L.J. 273, 293
(1997); Christian Joerges, 'Deliberative Political Processes' Revisited: What Have We Learnt
About the Legithnacy of Supranational Decision-Making, 44 J. COMMON MKT. STuD. 779, 790
(2006).
127. See Jilrgen Habermas, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, 11 NEw LEFT REv. 5, 11
(2001).
12 8. Id.
129. See Roberto Caranta, Introduction: The Future of Participation, in INTEREST
REPRESENTATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 6 (Roberto Caranta ed., 2008) ("In democracy
dimensions matter. The dimensions of nation states made direct democracy impracticable. The
dimension of-and diversity of the States and peoples composing-the European Union make
representative democracy problematic.").
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tools.'30 In contrast to the classic "community method" deployed in EU
decision-making processes, the Commission used alternative legal tools
addressing governance rather than law.3' Among these new tools,
predominantly addressing soft law rather than hard law, two regulatory
mechanisms emerged for the purpose of local governance: the open
method of coordination (OMC) and the tripartite agreements (TAs).
Both tools represented a similar shift in vision of decentralization from
unity to community. Rather than relying on the existing local
jurisdictions, new governance lawyers designed new transnational
networks of governance not limited by national boundaries.
New governance advocates provided a new regulatory framework
for EU policy to respond to the challenges of global governance.'32 The
lawyers conceptualizing the current changes in EU regulatory trends
have adopted a comparative approach to U.S. federal experimentalist
regulation.'33 New governance advocates have shown how bottom-up and
soft law approaches are an effective response to the failures of command-
and-control regulation in the EU.'34 Since 2000, the Commission has
130. See Christian Joerges, Integmtion Through De-Legalisation, 33 EUR. L. REv 291,
292 (2008). This article argues that the change in governance has been only an apparent one due
to the tremendous success of the open method of coordination, whereas in the 1980s there were
already other regulatory instruments dealing with "the failures of interventionist conceptions of
law and the search of methodologies, such as 'proceduralisation' and 'reflexive law', which could
then cope with new post-interventionist practices." Id.
131. See Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to
Governance M the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1 (2002).
132. These challenges are the increasing transnational character of legal regulation, the
shrinking of the state as a central regulatory actor and the ideological shift towards private
lawmaking and ultimately the departure from classic command-and-control approaches to
regulatory schemes. See Grainne de Birca & Joanne Scott, Introduction, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
513, 513-14 (2007).
133. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles E Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Expeimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REv 267 (1998); De B11rca & Scott, supra note 123, at 2; The
New Federalism: Plural Governance in a Decentered World 57 EMORY L.J. 1 (2007) (the 2007
Randolph W Thrower Symposium).
134. See HARm SCHEPEL, THE CONSTITUTION OF PRIVATE GOVERNANCE: PRODUCT
STANDARDS IN THE REGULATION OF INTEGRATING MARKETS (2005). Since 2000, the Lisbon
agenda aimed to make the EU "the most dynamic and competitive knowledge-based economy in
the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social
cohesion, and respect for the environment by 2010." NICOLA FONTAINE, LISBON EUROPEAN
COUNCIL 23 AND 24 MARCH 2000: PRESIDENCY CONCLUSION (Mar. 23-24, 2000), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lisl-en.htm. The Lisbon strategy was developed by the
European Council in 2000 to address unemployment and other EU social policies by
strengthening the connection between Brussels and subnational actors. Cities and regions
became, according to the Lisbon strategy, "key actors in the area of innovation, research and
education policies; they deliver more than 66% of all public investment in the EU; they are
increasingly focusing the Structural Funds expenditure on growth and jobs goals." Resolution of
the Committee of the Regions To Be Submitted to the European Spring Council 2008 on "The
Strategy for Growth and Jobs-Handling the 'Lisbon Paradox,"' 25 Apr. 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 105)
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widely used the OMC as a platform for its alternative regulatory
practices in social policy.'35 Instead of using binding regulations or more
flexible directives, the Commission adopted nonbinding guidelines that
are periodically monitored and reviewed. New governance tools are
nonhierarchical, decentralized, flexible, informal, and self-reflective.
Social security, employment strategies, and more recently immigration
policies are the areas in which new governance advocates have focused
on the "accommodation and promotion of diversity, on the importance of
provisionality and revisability-in terms of both problem definition and
anticipated solutions-and on the goal of policy learning."136
The success of new governance in the EU architecture derives in
part from a simple formula summarized by Chuck Sabel and Jonathan
Zeitlin.'" New governance procedures start by setting common goals at
the center-by Brussels and the Member States and then leaving
freedom at the periphery-for local governments and other
nongovernmental stakeholders. While connecting the various actors
through monitoring and reporting information, the common goals are
continuously readjusted to the expectation of the actors involved in the
process. In particular, new governance offers a buffer to the legitimacy
crisis and the democratic deficit pervading supranational institutions.
According to its advocates, new governance creates less controversial
and more flexible regulatory approaches to areas such as social policy
where the EU maintains a weak competence to intervene.'3 1
The Commission enlisted subnational actors in its quest for greater
participation, transparency, and effectiveness of its policies. The OMC is
an emblematic type of policy initiative that creates a network among civil
31 (EU) ("[W]elcoming that one of the key changes of the revised Lisbon Strategy adopted in
2005 is the concept of 'going local', aimed at stressing the role of the local and regional levels.").
In 2007, with the adoption of the Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (2007), the
European Council aimed to renew its municipal cooperation programs connecting Brussels
directly to its cities or through the activities of the CoR. For instance, the slogan "Europe is
'going local' was launched by the High Level Group. REPORT FROM THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP
CHAIRED BY WIM KOK, FACING THE CHALLENGE: THE LISBON STRATEGY FOR GROWTH AND
EMPLOYMENT 7 (Nov. 2004), available at http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/pdflkok-report-en.
pdf, see also Leipzig Charter on Sustainable European Cities (EC), supra note 23.
135. The OMC is open to different forms, like a cookbook "of recipes, with variants on a
theme, rather than a single recipe." See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BJRCA, EU LAW: TEXT,
CASES AND MATERIALS 153 (4th ed. 2008).
136. See De Bdrca &Scott, supa note 123, at 3.
137. See Charles E Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learming from Difference: The New
Architecture of Experhnentalist Governance in the EU 14 EuR L.J. 271 (2008). Other
institutional reasons for the success of new governance have been analyzed in vast and complex
literature. SeeCRAIG & DE BRCA, supr note 135, at 144.
138. SeeScott&Trubek,supranote 131,at6.
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society and local stakeholders in the creation of national action plans
presented to the Commission. In addressing governance rather than
legislation, soft rather than hard law, participation rather than
representation, the OMC connects local stakeholders to Brussels through
new transnational networks in which the state is no longer the main
interlocutor to the EU, but rather one player among many.'"
In its White Paper on European Governance, the Commission
advocated in favor of five principles as the basis of good and democratic
governance: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and
coherence.'40 To encourage subnational actors to participate in the
Commission's activities, the White Paper envisaged both a direct
engagement of local authorities 4' and a less direct avenue of engagement
through the CoR.'42 In this way, the Commission aimed to establish an
alternative set of tools to the classic community method by adding to
command-and-control regulatory approaches more experimental
instruments such as benchmarking, stakeholder participation, and
monitoring mechanisms.'43
The most successful new governance initiative was the OMC,
through which subnational units as well as civil society and private
stakeholders would be called upon to offer feedback, produce
139. See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation
Complementanity Rivalry orTransformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539,555-56(2007).
140. One of the various goals of the White Paper was to explore new democratic forms of
governance, mainly participatory and deliberative democracy, to better involve the European,
national and the regional levels. Commission White Paper on European Governance, at 3-4 COM
(2001) 428 final (July 25, 2001), available at http://europa.eu.int/int/eurlex/en/com/cnc/2001/
com2001_0428en0L.pdf [hereinafter White Paper]. In particular, the White Paper endorsed better
involvement and more openness; instituting openness through all stages of decision making;
ensuring consultation with regional and local governments and with civil society networks. Id
141. The Commission attempted to involve local and peripheral institutions together with
civil society and stakeholders in a closer conversation and coordination with the activities of the
center. See Margherita Poto, Participatory Rights in the Independent Adrinistrative Authority
System, h INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS, supra note 129, at 147.
142. The White Paper encouraged the CoR to develop proposals, reports and policy advice
on Community actions. White Paper, supra note 140, at 13-14. In the White Paper the
Commission appeared to champion the role of the CoR in regional matters:
At EU level, the Commission should ensure that regional and local knowledge and
conditions are taken into account when developing policy proposals. For this purpose,
it should organise a systematic dialogue with European and national associations of
regional and local government, while respecting national constitutional and
administrative arrangements. The Commission welcomes on-going efforts to increase
co-operation between those associations and the Committee of the Regions.
Id (emphasis added).
143. As Joanne Scott and David Trubek have shown, this trend towards new forms of
governance and a greater use of soft law mechanisms has marked a new approach towards
regulatory practices. See Scott & Trubek, supra note 131.
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knowledge, and create monitoring mechanisms in social policy areas."
The community vision influenced this form of concerted
decentralization, allowing Brussels to set goals and enabling national and
local experimentation. Through OMC networks a plethora of private and
public actors can exchange information for policy goals. However,
concerns arose regarding mechanisms for selecting local and civil society
stakeholders to participate in these deliberative networks because the
informality of the selection process might create distortions and
unfairness in participation.'
Despite the commitment of new governance advocates to
decentralization, the participation of local governments in the OMC has
been a limited one. As Joanne Scott noticed, the OMC lacked a regional
dimension to its process.'46 While the White Paper called for more direct
contact with the regions, the Commission only envisaged coordination
with national governments or with the CoR as an optional source of
consultation on subnational matters.'47 In this respect, subnational actors
also expressed their concern about retaining their social welfare
competences vis-i-vis the expansion of the OMC.'48 Several Linder
complained that despite its soft law and noncompulsory regulatory
mechanism, the OMC encroached upon education, health, and other
144. One example is the European Employment Strategy, in which the OMC has turned
out to create a successful policy network in the fight against unemployment. According to what
the Trubeks call a "decentralised consideration" perspective, "the EU's role would be to establish
broad objectives, and then facilitate policy reform and experimentation at the local level." A
decentralized concertation approach by the Commission opens up a place for participation of
local governments in European governance. In contrast to a "euro-corporatist vision" in which
welfare politics should involve centralized negotiation between the central governments and
Brussels, a decentralized approach emphasizes the importance of local experimentation and a
values-diverse approach to poverty reduction, unemployment policies and pension reforms. For a
more optimistic approach, see David Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, Hard and Sol Law in the
Construction ofSocial Europe The Role of the Open Method of Co-Operation, 11 EUR. L.J. 343,
345, 352, 354, 363 (2005). For a more critical approach based on practical outcomes, see
Kenneth A. Armstrong, The 'Europeanisation'of Social Exclusion: Bitish Adaptation to EUCo-
Ordnation, 8 BirT. J. POL. INT'L REL. 79 (2006).
145. For an insightful critique linking negotiation and new governance, see Amy J. Cohen,
Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interest, Skills, and Selves, 33 L. Soc. INQUIRY 503 (2008).
146. See Andrew Scott, The (Misshg) Regional Dimension to the Lisbon Strategy, 27
ScoTLAND EUROPA PAPERS 1 (2005).
147. Christiansen & Lintner, supr note 66, at 3.
148. With the streamlining of the OMC and its inclusion in the new Treaty of Lisbon, this
new governance tool is acquiring a constitutional status. After 2005, the Barroso Commission put
greater emphasis on economic and employment coordination strategies at the expense of social
protection/inclusion ones. See Kenneth Armstrong et al., JCMS Symposium: EU Governance
After Lisbon, 46 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 413, 418 (2008) (explaining that this created greater
interdependence between constitutionalism and governance mechanisms that brought new
potential as well limited radical change in the OMC process).
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welfare policies in which the Lfinder maintained exclusive competences.
Not surprisingly, in some cases, these new modes of governance rather
than promoting a "third level Europe" disempowered local actors at the
expense of European governance involving stakeholders rather than local
citizens.'49
III. THE FALSE PROMISE OF LOCAL AUTONOMY IN DEVELOPMENT
POLICY
The alliance between local governments and Brussels seems
promising because it can undermine state control over local
governments, thus creating local autonomy.'o This cooperation, however,
can be a threatening prospect for Member States because their authority
over subnational actors is undermined. Rather than asking whether more
local autonomy is better than less, this Article asks: What kinds of
autonomy do local governments gain from federal-local cooperation?
How do Member States react to regional cooperation with the EU? Did
local governments gain new power or did they just substitute federal with
state control?
EU regional or cohesion policies allocate funding to the peripheries
or the poorest regions because of the wealth inequality created by market
integration."' These policies have provided room to create alliances
between local and supranational actors in the EU as an exemplary model
of multilevel governance.'52 Commentators have argued, however, that
cohesion policies have almost the opposite effect, namely "renationali-
zation" or the empowerment of the Member States at the expense of local
governments.'" Thus, EU cohesion policies have a double effect.'54 On
149. See Ingeborg Tommel, Transformation of Governance: The European Commission &
Strategy for Creating a "Europe of the Regions, "8 REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 52, 73 (1998) ("[T]he
newly emerging patterns of decision-making and consensus building evolve independently of or
even against formal distribution of powers between government levels.").
150. This type of federal-local cooperation also takes place in the United States, where the
federal government makes arrangements to distribute money or cooperate directly with local
governments, thus undercutting the power of the states in their control over local decision-
making. See Nestor M. Davidson, Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era
of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L. REv. 959, 968-74 (2007) (explaining new forms of federal local
cooperation in the aftermath of September 11 and Hurricane Katrina, and on fiscal federalism).
151. See Gary Marks, Exploring and Explaining Variation in EU Cohesion Policy, i
COHESION POLICY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BUILDING MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 388, 391
(Liesbet Hooghe ed., 1996).
152. Id. at 389. In the United States, EU cohesion policy provided a source of inspiration
to significant reform proposals in the context of local government law. See Gerald E. Frug,
Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 1766 (2002).
153. See Jeffrey J. Anderson, Skeptical Reflections on a Europe of Regions: Britain,
Germany and the ERDF 10 J. PUB. POL'Y 417, 417 (1990); Mark A. Pollack, RegionalActors in
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the one hand, local governments have sought a way to constitute
transnational alliances with Brussels against their Member States.'" On
the other hand, some Member States maintained control of their
subnational entities by becoming the main intermediaries between
Brussels and the regions in the allocation of European resources.56
Thus, this "shared administration" between the EU and the regions
in the disbursement of EU funds had created a tremendous possibility for
empowering local governments by undercutting state control over local
decision making.'" Nevertheless, EU policies did not create new legal
power for local governments against state control.' On the contrary, in
some cases the EU empowerment of localities has produced the opposite
outcome; that is, strengthening Member States or EU control over local
decision making.'" Subpart A sheds light on the main problems as well
as the reform proposals about disbursing EU funds to the regions.
Subpart B shows that the effects of EU cohesion policies in different
Member States are highly disparate, path-dependent on the local
administrative models, and ultimately influenced by diverse economic
geographic factors. In fact, cohesion policy can succeed at times, thus
achieving its local economic development goals, while at others it fails
because rather than achieving the desired economic development
objective on a particular territory, it reinforces state control over
localities, or it substitutes EU for state control.
an Intergovernmental Play: The Makng and Implementation of EC Structual Policy, In THE
STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: BUILDING A EUROPEAN POLITY? 361, 362 (Carolyn Rhodes &
Sonia Mazey eds., 1995).
154. This double effect has created a large controversy among scholars seeking to address
who really governs EU cohesion policy and what the real contribution of local actors is in
deciding the allocation of the structural funds. For an excellent reconstruction of the debate, see
John Bachtler & Carlos Mendez, Who Governs EU Cohesion Policy? Deconstructng the
Reforms ofthe Structuralunds, 45 J. COMMON MKT STUD. 535 (2007).
155. See LIESBET HOOGHE & GARY MARKS, MuLTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 114 (2001) ("Regional and local actors have used partnership to challenge their
national governments. British local authorities, for example, called on the Commission's support
in resisting Conservative government's policy of centralization.").
156. See Scott, supra note 19, at 625-52 (explaining the changing notion of "partnership"
through which the Commission pushed the Member States to gain greater control and
responsibility on the allocation of the structural funding); see also Andrew Moravcsik,
Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovemmentalist Approach,
31 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 473 (1993) (explaining the renationalization thesis).
157. See Paul P. Craig, SharedAdmnisation, Disbursement of Community Funds and the
Regulatory State, in LEGAL CHALLENGES IN EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED
ADMINISTRATION 34, 37 (H. Hofmann & A. Turk eds., 2009).
158. Frug, supra note 7, at 554; FRUG & BARRON, supra note 5, at 45.
159. See Pollack, supra note 153, at 362.
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A. Cohesion Policy To Reduce Wealth Dispaities in the Peipheries
Despite its uncertain future when the founding fathers established
the Treaty of Rome (1957), in the 1970s cohesion policy became the
major economic development tools that Brussels used in order to address
the imbalances created by the common market and to reduce disparities
among European regions."0 Through its cohesion policy, the Union
promotes economic growth in the poorer regions in Europe through the
disbursement of EU funds."' Despite its early start, cohesion policy
encountered many institutional as well as ideological challenges until the
mid-1980s when Jacques Delors, the former president of the European
Commission, linked cohesion policy to the completion of the common
market to more effectively involve local governments in cohesion
policy.'62
1. The Disbursement of EU Funds
As early as 1988, the Community took seriously the goal of
enlisting regional actors in the decision making and implementation of
the cohesion policy through the cooperation or partnership between the
Commission, the Member States, and their subnational governments.'63
At the time, two regulations defined the major objectives of cohesion
policy and they established the procedures for the regions to gain access
to structural funding through the intermediation of the Member States."
160. See FABRIZIO BARCA, AN AGENDA FOR A REFORMED COHESION POLICY: A PLACE-
BASED APPROACH TO MEETING EUROPEAN UNION CHALLENGES AND EXPECTATIONS 13 (Apr. 27,
2009) [hereinafter BARCA REPORT], available at http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/policy/future/
pdf/report barca.v0306.pdf. Cohesion policy was initially created in the 1960s and in the mid-
1970s, when the Community established a European Regional Development Fund in order to deal
more directly with the regions. The early 1970s was the moment when "the plan [was] to deepen
the internal market and to launch [the] Economic and Monetary Union and the expected adverse
effects of this on regional disparities." Id.
161. See Marks, supra note 151, at 391.
162. See Liesbet Hooghe, Building a Europe with the Regions: The Changing Role of the
European Commission, in COHESION POLICY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BUILDING MULTI-
LEVEL GOVERNANCE, supm note 151, at 89. In this respect, the Commission's Directorate
General for Regional Policy became the most important actor managing structural funds,
including regional funds as well as agricultural and social funds. Id.
163. See PAUL CRAIG, EU ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 73 (2006). The partnership phase takes
place during the operational programs that occur in a third phase of cohesion policy after the
preparation of regional plans by the states and the creation of a support framework by the
Commission. During the operational program, the partnership principle plays an important role
because decisions regarding which project to finance are made not at one level at the expense of
the other, but within a framework of multilevel (and multiactor) governance, based upon sharing
responsibility. Scott, supa note 19, at 634.
164. See Council Regulation 2052/88, On the Tasks of the Structural Funds and Their
Effectiveness and on Coordination of Their Activities Between Themselves and with the
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These EU regulations left much discretion to the states in devolving
powers to their local governments accessing structural funds." The
shortcomings of these commitments, however, became evident when
regions had very limited discretion over the decisions on the allocation of
resources.'66
EU cohesion policy aims to create a "stable and harmonious
growth" in the common market."' The main instrument lies in structural
funds, which have a vast application in financing social and economic
projects and include the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF),
the European Social Fund (ESF), and the Agricultural Fund.' Although
EU regulations setting the general guidelines for cohesion policy are
adopted through unanimous voting by the Council of Ministers, in
deciding on the allocation of the ERDF, the EU adopts the codecision
procedure that fully involves the European Parliament and mandates the
consultation of the CoR and the Economic and Social Council.' The
four guiding principles in the allocation of the structural funds are:
(1) concentration, whereby the funds would be concentrated in the
regions of greater need; (2) additionality, whereby the funds are bringing
Operations of the European Investment Bank and the Other Existing Financial Instruments, 1988
O.J. (L 185) 9; Council Regulation 4253/88, Laying Down Provisions for Implementing
Regulation 2052/88 art. 9, 1988 O.J. (L 374) 1.
165. See Council Regulation 1083/2006, art. 105, 2006 O.J. (L 210) 25 (describing the
European Regional Development Fund).
166. See Caranta, supm note 129, at 8.
167. According to the EU Treaty of Amsterdam, the Community is committed to
eliminating disparities and offering incentives to poorer economies to become more competitive
in the market through various instruments addressing socioeconomic disparities among regions.
SeeTFEU art. 174; EC Treaty art. 158 ("In order to promote its overall harmonious development,
the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social,
and territorial cohesion. In particular, the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the
levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness of the least favoured
regions.").
168. See Inforegio Factsheet 2006, EuR. COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/
sources/docoffic/official/regulation/pdf/publications/memo-en.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
There is also the cohesion fund, which targets infrastructure and other environmental projects but
is not based on regional or local policies, and is redistributed among specific Member States. By
contrast, the Structural Funds are targeting regions and, more consistently, subnational entities in
addressing six different objectives that since 1993 have been broadening the EC development
strategies, such as adaptation of workers to industrial change or economic adjustment of
underdeveloped areas. The revision of the Objectives of the structural funds were modified in
1993. Council Regulation 2081/93, Amending Regulation 2052/88, art. 1, 1993 O.J. (L 193) 5
(establishing objectives as follows: (1) the promotion of the development and structural
adjustment of the Regions; (2) the conversion of Regions seriously affected by industrial decline;
(3) fighting against long-term unemployment; (4) facilitating the adaptation of workers to
industrial change; and (5) creating a new Fund addressing problems related to Fisheries.).
169. See TFEU art. 307 (establishing decision procedure which requires consultation of
the CoR).
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additional money to areas where other forms of aid come from the
Member States; (3) partnership, whereby the involvement of regional and
local actors achieve a similar ends; and (4) programming, whereby the
number of years for determinate projects is established.' 0
The procedure to allocate funds to particular regions begins with a
consultation by the Member States with their subnational partners in
order to present to the Commission their regional development plans.
After reviewing these plans, the Commission creates a "Community
Support Framework," which establishes the modus operandi of the funds
for a period of three to five years.'' Meanwhile, a Community Support
Fund establishes the financing, the forms of assistance, and the
monitoring of each project financed by the EU. 2
In 1999, in the shadow of the European enlargement towards the
East, another wave of cohesion policy reform limited the four objectives
to three in order to minimize the increase in expenses due to the entry of
new Member States in the EU."' In 2006, during the last significant
reform wave, the EU allocated about a third of its budget-around E330
billion-to cohesion policy during the 2007-13 period."' New
regulations established the general framework for structural funds, their
principal objectives, their partnership rules, and the management and
evaluation of specific development projects."'
Today, three main objectives of the structural funds are limited to
convergence, regional competitiveness and employment, and European
territorial cooperation.16 The aspects that characterized the 2006 reform
were economic growth and a greater competitiveness to fight unemploy-
ment, the promotion of sustainable development, and a knowledge-based
170. SCeCRAIG, supm note 163, at 73.
171. See Council Regulation 4253/88, supranote 164, art. 8; CRAIG, supra note 163, at 73-
74.
172. CRAIG, suponote 163, at 74.
173. See Council Regulation 1260/1999, Laying Down General Provisions on the
Structural Funds art. 1, 1999 O.J. (L 161) 1. On these reforms, see also MICHAEL W BAUER, A
CREEPING TRANSFORMATION?: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF EU
STRUCTURAL FUNDS IN GERMANY (2001).
174. See Council Regulation 1081/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 210) 12 (repealing Council
Regulation 1784/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 213) 1); Council Regulation 1083/2006, supm note 165
(laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European
Social Fund, and the Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation 1260/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 161) 1
(EC)).
175. See Council Regulation 1083/2006, supm note 165 (limiting the allocation of
resources among three principal instruments, the European Regional Development Fund, the
European Social Fund, and the Cohesion Fund).
176. See Inforegio Factsheet 2006, supra note 168.
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economy.'" This last wave of reform promoted greater Member State
control in the implementation and management of the various projects.'"
Today, scholars are deeply divided between those who argue that
structural funds policies have paved the way to multilevel governance
between Brussels and the subnational level,' 9 and those who argue
instead that cohesion policies ultimately served to strengthen the role of
the Member States as a form of "renationalization.""
Multilevel governance advocates argued that the 1999 reforms, with
budgetary cuts and greater constraints on the Commission's activism,
have endangered the careful allocation of powers among the national,
local, and supranational actors.' This interplay of actors characterized
multilevel governance in the EU where at various stages of structural
planning different actors have different responsibilities.' Liesbet
Hooghe highlights that local partners have greater responsibility in the
monitoring and implementation of structural programming rather than in
establishing national and regional development priorities.' The
partnership criterion, however, has proven to be somewhat problematic
insofar as it has worked differently in poorer regions and has created
incentives for local conflicts, rather than cooperation, between local
governments and their central governments.34 This principle has worked
more or less effectively depending on the different territories. In
England, for instance, the structural funds partnership arrangement
worked better than in Scotland, where there is a greater tradition of
177. Council Regulation 1083/2006, supra note 165, para. 2.
178. Id. para. 65 ("In accordance with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,
Member States should have the primary responsibility for the implementation and control of the
interventions."); CRAIG, supra note 163, at 77.
179. See Marks, supm note 124, at 401.
180. See MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION,
AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE EU 10 (2003); Adrianne Hritier, Differential Europe:
National Adminstrative Responses to Community Policy, in TRANSFORMING EUROPE:
EUROPEANIZATION AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 44, 44-45 (Maria Green Cowles et al. eds., 2001).
181. Francesc Morata & Xavier Mufioz, Vyng for European Funds. Tenitorial
Reconstruction in Spain, In COHESION POLICY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BUILDING MULTI-
LEVEL GOVERNANCE, supra note 151, at 195; see also Richard Balme & Bernard Jouve, Buildng
the Regional State: Europe and Terntonal Organization of Fnoce, in COHESION POLICY AND
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BUILDING MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE, supm note 151, at 219.
182. Hooghe, supra note 162, at 89.
183. Id.
184. Morata & Mufioz, supa note 181, at 195 (explaining that poorer regions are more
problematic to implement structural fimds policies for the fact that local actors are under
resourced and often pervaded by clientelism). The case of domestic tug-of-war between center
and regions happened in the case of Spain and with local authorities in England opposing the
Conservative government by allying with the European Commission. Id.
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decentralization of power, while overall the central government was
"firmly in control of the key decisions."'
The renationalization phenomenon happened through the
cooperation between the Member States and the Commission in selecting
projects receiving the grants and in monitoring their implementation,
which has over time shifted to emphasize a greater role for the Member
States with the effect of empowering their national governments.'" As
scholars demonstrated, the EU is still controlled by the Member States at
the expense of the Commission and other subnational entities.' In
reality, through structural funding, the EU is producing a
"recentralization" within its Member States by strengthening the
positions of the central governments vis-i-vis their local bodies.' For
instance, within the sanction and incentive instruments set up by the
Commission to ensure the implementation of the projects, these
processes heavily rely on the responsibility of the Member States rather
than the regional or local governments, which are the ultimate
beneficiaries of the funds.'89 Moreover, recent reforms have supported
the renationalization backlash by allowing Member States to heavily
determine spatial allocation of regional competitiveness and employment
funding on their territories.' Finally, through the streamlining of the
185. See Ian Bache, The Extended Gatekeeper: Central Government and the
Irnplementation ofECRegional Policy in the LX 6 J. EUR. PuB. PoCY 28, 36 (1999) (explaining
that in the UK case, the national government in EU cohesion policy has become the extended
gatekeeper that operates at the different stages of the structural funds policies).
186. See JOANNE Scorr, DEVELOPMENT DILEMMAS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY.
RETHINKING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY 19, 27 (1995) (emphasizing that the first trend of
reforms aimed at creating greater discretion of the Member States in the selection and the
allocation of the Funds and highlighting that the Commission realized that the partnership
principle was very weak in the implementation of the ERDF and ESF); see also CRAIG, supra
note 163, at 81 (explaining that in the late 1980s the Commission acquired greater control over
the "formulation and the identification of priorities" in drafting the guidelines for the allocation of
the funds).
187. See Pollack, supra note 153; Carolyn Rhodes & Sonia Mazey, Introduction:
Integation in TheoreticalPelspective, in 3 THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: BUILDING A
EUROPEAN POLITY?, supra note 153, at 1, 1-3.
188. See Andrew Evans, Regional Dimensions to European Governance, 52 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 21, 22, 26 (2003). The author borrows the concept of "recentralisation" from J.
Biancarelli, La Communautd europenne et les collectivit6s locales: une double dialectique
complexe, 60 REVUE FRANCAISE D'ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE 515, 526 (1991).
189. See CRAIG, supra note 163, at 88-91 (explaining that the Commission has increased
powers to prevent irregularities under Council Regulation 2988/95, 1995 O.J. (L 312) 1).
190. See Bachtler & Mendez, supra note 154, at 545. In this respect, the Lisbon strategy
aiming at sustainability as well as fighting against unemployment and promoting the knowledge
economy was the compromise reached by the Commission. In embracing these Lisbon objectives
the Commission maintained the allocation of structural funding not only for less-developed
countries, but at the same time it also recognized greater decision-making power to those member
states that remained net contributors. Id
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programming documents promoted by the 1999 reform wave, the
Member States have gained greater power vis-i-vis the Commission."'
Before the streamlining the Commission was able to control the Member
States through long negotiations, afterwards, however, the Commission
maintained much more limited bargaining power in the presentation and
the selection of the projects.'92 Although straightening local autonomy
remains a key element in monitoring and implementing cohesion policy,
there is a great amount of flexibility and variation in the negotiation
process between the Member States, the local governments, and the
Commission in the allocation of the funding.'93
Thus, the 2006 reforms of the structural funds for the 2007-13
period are a mixed bag.'94 On the one hand, the new regulations have
strengthened the role of the Member States in determining what regional
areas will be in need of structural help to improve regional
competitiveness and employment problems in their regions.' On the
other hand, the funds are spent in regions determined by an EU-wide
criterion that leaves little room for decision to the Member States.96
Rather than a constant gain for the Member States at the expense of the
Commission, the 1999 future reforms of structural funds should be
instead conceived as a "period of tug of war between both sets of
actors."19"
2. Challenges and Reforms of Cohesion Policy
In allocating the money to regions or cities through structural funds,
Brussels ties the money to different economic and political conditions set
up in its regulations. Such conditions are the result of political as well as
macroeconomic choices made by the EU about the goals that should be
19 1. Id.
192. See Marks, supm note 151, at 394-95; Gary Marks et al., European Integration from
the 1980s: State-Centric vs. Multi-Level Governance, 34 J. COMMoN MKT. STUD. 341, 343
(1996).
193. See Bachtler & Mendez, supm note 154, at 548-60 (explaining how each negotiation
over programming and monitoring takes place through a constant negotiation with the
Commission).
194. See Council of the Eur. Union, Final Proposal from the Presidency on the Financial
Perspective 2007-2013 (Dec. 19, 2005), http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms Data/docs/pressdatalen/
misc/87677.pdf.
195. See Bachtler & Mendez, supm note 154, at 544 (explaining that renationalization
happened in particular in relation to the third objective of cohesion policies).
196. See David Allen, Cohesion and Structural Funds: Transfers and Tmdeoffs, i POLICY-
MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 237 (Helen Wallace & William Wallace eds., 2005).
197. See Bachtler & Mendez, supm note 154, at 545 ("Power relationships moved in both
directions over time and the outcome varied depending on whether one is referring to eligibility
criteria, designation methodologies or ceilings on coverage.").
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achieved by its cohesion policies. Local and regional governments often
encounter different problems depending on their ability to share the
administration of these projects with Brussels.' Because of these
conditions, clashes may arise over the substance of EU development
policies or simply over the procedures of this shared administration.199
The 2006 Regulation reformed the partnership principle in order to
include the competent regional, local, and urban, as well as economic
and social partners and the other appropriate nongovernmental bodies
representing civil society in the project formation.200 This new regulation
expressly embraced the principles of nondiscrimination and sustainable
development in pursuing the implementation of cohesion policy.20'
Structural funds, which comprised about 35% of the EU budget
corresponding in 2007 to E45.5 billion,202 were strongly connected to
local autonomy and urban development by Commissioner for Regional
Policy, Danuta Hiibner.20 3 While in the 1990s, the approach to develop-
198. See Kevin Featherstone, Introduction in GREECE IN A CHANGING EUROPE: BETWEEN
EUROPEAN AND BALKAN DISINTEGRATION? 3, 4 (Kevin Featherstone & Kostas Infantis eds., 1996).
199. Clashes can arise between substantive development goals enlisted by Brussels and the
local understandings of regional development. Thus, local actors perceive Europeanization as a
new form of imposition that is even more problematic than state control. See Loukas Tsoukalis,
Is Greece an Awkward Partner?, in GREECE IN A CHANGING EUROPE: BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND
BALKAN DISINTEGRATION, supra note 198, at 24, 25.
200. See Council Regulation 1083/2006, supra note 165 para. 11.
201. Id para. 2. This pluralist approach toward local actors coupled with a strong
commitment to sustainability is part of the Lisbon strategy that has enlisted cities along with other
subnational actors, as the main beneficiaries of structural funds policies. Id
202. Cornelius Baihr, How Does Sub-National Autonomy Affect the Effectiveness of
Structural Funds ?, 61 KYKLOS 3, 4 (2008). In response to the need of greater decentralization in
cohesion policy in order to more consistently involve local governments the Council adopted a
2006 regulation of the structural funds and the Commission has adopted a communication on
Cohesion Policy and Cities. Annex to the Communication from the Commission to Council and
Parliament Cohesion Policy and Cities: The Urban Contribution to Growth and Jobs in the
Regions, COM (2006) 385 final (July 13, 2006) [hereinafter Urban Contribution]; see Council
Regulation 1083/2006, supm note 165 (laying down general provisions on the European Regional
development Fund, the European Social Fund, and the Cohesion Fund, and repealing Regulation
1260/1999 (EC)).
203. Urban Contribution, supra note 202, at 3. President Danuta Hiibner put forward a
new agenda promoting urban development as a better strategy to achieve economic growth as
well as to create more jobs, foster social inclusion, and improve environmental quality, which
became the Community Strategic Guidelines for Cohesion. Id. This document sets the
framework and future priorities for European funded programs from 2007 to 2013. Id; see also
Inforegio Factsheet2006, supra note 168. The current guidelines establish the highest investment
ever made by the EU through cohesion instruments aiming to support regional growth. The main
allocation of wealth is distributed according these percentages:
81.54% of the total amount will be concentrated on the "Convergence" objective, under
which the poorest Member States and regions are eligible. In the remaining regions,
about 15.95% of the Structural Funds will be concentrated on supporting innovation,
sustainable development, better accessibility and training projects under the "Regional
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ment by the Community was very unidirectional, in the sense that under
the rubric of development policy Brussels was circumscribed strictly to
economic rather than other forms of social and sustainable develop-
ment.2 ' Today, flexibility and sustainability have become part of the new
guidelines addressing structural funds.205
In its 2006 Communication, the Commission set new urban goals
for the EU cohesion policy.206 Its urban policy includes not only typical
economic development goals but also sustainable growth objectives,
supporting innovation in entrepreneurship through the knowledge
economy to create more and better jobs in urban settings. For instance,
in order to make cities "more attractive," the Commission envisages
cities that will attract investments while creating more jobs through the
enhancement of public-private partnerships and the privatization of city
services.207 The justifications put forward for this sustainable agenda are
still market-driven, rather than oriented towards a form of social
citizenship.200 The linkage between sustainability and economic develop-
Competitiveness and Employment" objective. Another 2.52% will be available for
cross-border, transnational and interregional co-operation under the "European
Territorial Co-operation" objective.
Id.
204. From this perspective, Joanne Scott addressed what she called the "accounting
syndrome" of the community in its regional development policy:
It is then apparent that the Community's preoccupation with rising per capita GDP as
the ultimate expression of development not only fails to address the issue of the
distribution of benefits which can be secured by way of a rising income but also
marginalizes, almost to the point of irrelevance, those material dimensions of human
need, be it in relation to the provision of health care, education, public utilities or
transport, which cannot realistically be purchased by the isolated consumer.
See Scorr, supm note 186, at 55.
205. See Communication from the Commission on the Simplification, Clarifcation,
Coordination and Flexible Management of the Structural Policies 2000-06, EUR. COMM'N (Apr.
25, 2003), http://europa.eu/legislation-summaries/regional-policy/management/g242224_en.html
(pushing the Member States to introduce soft law reforms in addressing the selection,
responsibility, and management of the projects). As to sustainability, the urban dimension has
heavily promoted an "integrated approach" to cohesion policy, which links economic growth
through full employment with social and environmental goals. Urban Contribution, supra note
202, at 25.
206. See Urban Contribution, supra note 202, at 4.
207. The central features to promote this economic growth strategy consist of the
improvement of transportation infrastructure, greater access to modem and affordable services,
the conservation of the environment, and the promotion of the cultural sector in each city. See id
208. The urban development projects could be supported within the framework of the
ERDF, the European Social Fund (ESF), and the Cohesion Funds. The communication also
suggests assistance from the new financial instruments JASPERS, JEREMIE, and JESSICA, and
from public-private partnerships. See The Funds: Special Supporting Instruments, EUR.
COMM'N, http://ec.europa.eu/regional-policy/thefunds/instruments/index-en.cfin (last visited Nov.
9, 2011).
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ment is now a top priority on the Commission agenda. As development
scholars have noted, a similar linkage between gender, environmental,
and social goals has characterized the new development policy trends of
the World Bank and other major financial institutions. 209  Whether
neoliberalism is just reappearing in new clothes or whether sustainability
is a real priority on the Commission agenda remains an ambiguity at the
core of EU cohesion policy.210
Commentators noted that the term "cohesion" means more than
economic convergence because it has a "dual aim of reducing regional
disparities and boosting aggregate competitiveness."21 ' Regarding this
duality a constant tension emerges reflecting a deeper divide between
two opposite development objectives: neoliberalism versus regulated
capitalism.2 2
The neoliberal objective is to create an internal market insulated
from political and governmental interferences. In this respect, cohesion
policy has more an allocative rather than a distributive function, whereby
it aims to stimulate growth and competitiveness in the market by
increasing GDP per head rather than redistributing income to poorer
regions.213 Behind neoliberalism lies the idea of offering incentives to
local governments in order to compete as best suppliers in the offer of
public goods to European consumer-citizens.214 Thus the neoliberal
agenda for cohesion policy promotes greater subsidiarity by stimulating
competitiveness among the regions.2 5
209. See Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development Second-Generation
Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 203, 203 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).
210. See Christian laione, Local Public Entrepreneurship and Local Self-Government-
The Rule of Law and the Role of the Judiciary: The Afiermath of Global Competition Among
Local Governments? 3-4, 6 (N.Y. Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-07, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-977321 (reading the EU framework as promoting local
public entrepreneurship).
211. See lain Begg et al., Cohesion in the EU 9 CESIFo E 3, 3 (2008).
212. See CHRIS RUMFORD, EUROPEAN COHESION? CONTRADICTIONS IN EU INTEGRATION 67
(2000). In describing the conflicting visions behind cohesion strategies in the EU, Chris Rumford
has persuasively shown how two competing narratives pervade European development strategies:
cohesion and autonomization. Rumford portrays the autonomization as a narrative with strong
ties to neoliberalism that promote regionalism as a way to favor growth and less centralized state
control, while "the region enters this political arena on the side of the market." Id at 68.
213. SeeMarks, supa note 151, at 391.
214. See Fernando Christian laione, Local Public Entrepreneurship and Judicial
Intervention on Euro-American Global Perspective (2007) (unpublished manuscript), http://
works.bepress.com/fernando_christian-iaione/3/.
215. See lain Begg, Subsidiarity in Regional Policy, in SUBSIDIARITY AND ECONOMIC
REFORM IN EUROPE 291, 305-06 (George Gelauff, Isabel Grilo & Arjan Lejour eds., 2008).
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Conversely, the regulated capitalism objective aims to promote an
EU capable of "regulating markets, redistributing resources and shaping
partnership among public and private actors."2 6 The Commission in the
post-Lisbon scenario has appropriated this notion, which goes back to
Jaques Delors' idea of "espace organis," to promote economic develop-
ment by enlisting decentralized approaches, flexibility, and sustainability
in its agenda.217
Because of these conflicting aims, the effectiveness of cohesion
policy has been highly contested."' Some economists have shown that
the beneficial effects of structural funds can be measured through the
enhancement of human capital which differs enormously from state to
state.2 9  Because of the challenges to their effectiveness and the
increasing difficulties for the EU to sustain large disbursement of funds
in the midst of a financial crisis, politicians and technocrats have
suggested either severely cutting these expenditures for the new
disbursement period of 2014-2020 or increasing their use in a more
targeted way vis-A-vis Greece and Ireland.
In 2008, the Commission addressed some of the problems with
cohesion policy in its Green Paper, Tenitorial Cohesion: Turning
Teitoial Diversity into Strength, where it acknowledges that in order to
achieve a more balanced and harmonious development, cohesion policies
should adjust to the most appropriate territorial scale.220 Since 2009, with
the publishing of the Barca Report endorsed by the Commission, the
objective of reforming cohesion policy has become a priority.22' The
report proposes some important reforms such as departing from targeting
216. Liesbet Hooghe & Gary Marks, The Making ofa Polity: The Struggle over European
Integation, in CONTINUrrY AND CHANGE IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALISM 86 (Herbert Kitschelt et
al. eds., 1999).
217. See JAQUES DELORS, OUR EUROPE: THE COMMUNITY AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
(1992); see also ScoTT, supa note 186, at 16-74 (arguing that a sustainable development
approach should take into account both distributive consequences and human flourishing in
promoting local welfare).
218. See ROBERT LEONARDI, COHESION POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE BUILDING OF
EUROPE 8 (2005) (pointing out that the outcome of structural funds can be measured when
cohesion policy "represents a political goal tied to the pursuit of a more egalitarian and just
society capable of creating opportunities for all EU citizens").
219. See Bflhr, supra note 202; Sim6n Sosvilla Rivero, EU Structural Funds and Spain
Objective 1 Regions: An Analysis Based on the Hermin Model (FEDEA Working Paper No.
2005-24, Oct. 2005), available athttp://ssm.com/abstract-844145.
220. This would mean "more responsive to local preferences and needs and better
coordinated with other policies, at all levels in conformity with the principle of subsidiarity." See
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Committee
of the Regions and the European Economic and Social Committee, Green Paper on Ternitonal
Cohesion, Tuning Tenitorial Diversity hto Strngth, at 4, COM (2008) 616 final (Oct. 6, 2008).
221. See BARCA REPORT, supra note 160.
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the Regions "lagging behind" to distributing funding among Member
States and Regions based on their "needs and strategies." 22  Most
interestingly the report takes economic geography seriously by
introducing both conceptual as well as institutional innovative aspects.
For instance, it suggests using a new paradigm with a place-based policy
to tackle "persistent underutilisation of potential and reducing persistent
social exclusion in specific places through external interventions and
multilevel governance."223 In Barca's view:
The place-based approach goes beyond the traditional dilemma of fiscal
federalism whether to decentralise or centralise any given public function.
The responsibility for policy design and implementation is allocated
among different levels of government supported by both contractual
relations and trust, with a role being played by special-purpose
institutions.224
In using an economic geography lens, the report is acknowledging
that the causes creating economic disparity across otherwise similarly
situated geographical regions is the result of historical accidents, path
dependence, and spatial persistence that should be addressed by pursuing
both growth and competitiveness in the region.225 In creating a leading
role for the Commission, at the expense of national and local
governments, the Barca Report suggests a more centralizing role for the
Directorates General (DG) Regio in order to allocate resources and basic
services to different territories. This "refocusing and strengthening" of
the DG Regio would provide better skills in designing the development
agenda as well as implementing and monitoring the projects.22
Another institutional innovation of the Barca Report is to
contractualize the relation between the Commission and the Member
States in order to create more leverage for the Commission and better
tailor the development policy to the "needs of places."227 Even though
these contracts are not a new initiative, past experiences have not been
very successful because they were an attempt to decentralize power
rather than achieving targeted objectives in which the Commission
222. Id. at XVIII; see also Caruso, supra note 121 (commenting on this shift of the Barca
Report).
223. BARCA REPORT, supm note 160, at VII ("[T]his strategy is superior to alternative
strategies that do not make explicit and accountable their territorial focus, or even hide it behind a
screen of self-proclaimed space-blindness, fail to integrate services, and either assume that the
State knows best or rely on the choices and guidance of a few private actors.").
224. Id. at XI.
225. See Schragger, supa note 8, at 1888.
226. See BARCA REPORT, supra note 160, at XXIII.
227. SeeidatXVI.
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provided very little guidelines, for instance through the so-called
Tripartite Agreements.22 These agreements among the Commission, the
Member States, and their subnational actors were an attempt to involve
local governments directly in developing localized strategy.229 Member
States, instead of the regions, would share the liability of implementing
the projects and the Commission retained the ultimate responsibility of
executing, monitoring, and enforcing the projects. Thus, the substantial
involvement of the Member States in TAs limited the autonomy and the
visibility of subnational actors.
In 2004, the Commission enacted the first TA with the Italian
government and the Lombardy Region and this soon became an example
of the limited authority of the region in these types of agreements.230
Milan was ravaged by pollution as a result of the quantity of vehicles
continually flooding the city from the entire region.23' Rather than
adopting an environmental directive, the Commission addressed the
problem by directly financing a solution plan with the Lombardy region
and the Italian government.232 The general principles of the contractual
agreement regulating this partnership defined the responsibility of the
Italian government in the final execution of the project.233 However, in
2005, the contract was suspended by the Italian government. The
Commission's role in the TAs was to assess the results of the partnership
and improve governance.234 After Milan, three European cities created
228. See Communication from the Commission, A Framework for Target-Based Tnpartite
Contracts and Agreements Between the Community the States and Regional and Local
Authorities, at 2, COM (2002) 709 final (Dec. 11, 2002).
229. See ESPON PROJECT 2.3.2, GOVERNANCE OF TERRITORIAL AND URBAN POLICIES FROM
EU To LOCAL LEVEL 44 (Dec. 30, 2004), http://www.espon.eu/exports/sites/default/Documents/
Projects/ESPON2006/Projects/PolicylmpactProjects/Govemancel.ir_2.3.2.pdf [hereinafter ESPON
PROJECT 2.3.2] ("The need of formal settlements to make territorial governance accountable and
effective has led the Commission to propose target-based tripartite contracts and agreements
between the Community, the States and the regional or local authorities as a flexible means of
taking specific contexts into consideration when drawing up and implementing Community
policies.").
230. Tripartite Agreement, European Commission, Italian Government, Lombardy Region
(Oct. 15, 2004), http://www.ec.europa.eu/govemance/docs/texte conventiontripartiteen.pdf.
231. Id
2 3 2. Id
233. Id art. 8. While Lombardy did not actively commit to the agreement in terms of
determining the "specific and quantifiable policy objectives to attain," the agreement has been
"used by both European and the regional tiers more for its instrumental added value than for its
specific environmental policy outputs." Martino Mazzoleni, The Fst TipartiteAgreement in the
EU An Actor-Centred Analysis of an Experimental Multi-Level Interaction, 16 REGIONAL &
FED. STUD. 263, 273 (2006).
234. Article 3 of the Tripartite Agreement states the objective of the Agreement as
improving through better governance the implementation of EU policies ... through a
wide involvement of the stakeholders in the policy making. This involvement will
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similar target-based agreements: Lille (France), Birmingham (UK) and
Pescara (Italy).' Despite the enthusiasm of the Commission reports on
governance, TAs did not become an important model of governance in
the EU.
One problem was the political instability that characterized these
agreements, especially when two opposing political parties controlling
the central and the regional government would struggle in reaching an
agreement on the policy goals and the sharing of resources. In the case
of Milan, the Lombardy region successfully joined political forces with
Rome and Brussels to fight pollution.236 However, the alliance was at risk
and it became unstable when the center-right coalition in power both at
the national and regional levels lost the national elections. Rather than
developing collaborative local networks, TAs cooperation was based on
political collaboration through domestic party politics instead of
pragmatic policy proposals.237 Another problem was their competitive
rather than the cooperative nature.238 As a result, TAs increased
competition among regions and cities in order to attract resources both at
the national and European level.239
Local governments remained suspicious of TAs and only a limited
number of proposals were implemented.240 Instead of fostering federal-
local cooperation and undermining state control to foster
decentralization, national governments were fully in control of the
funding and the enforcement of these projects. Similar to cohesion
policy, this is another example of how decentralization through the
disbursement of EU funds simply meant renationalization rather than
result in an effective local governance process ... from the involvement of, and close
participation by, the authorities and local bodies in the implementation of European
policies and programmes that have a significant impact on the area.
Tripartite Agreement, supra note 230.
235. See ESPON PROJECT 2.3.2, supra note 229, at 44.
236. Tripartite Agreement, supra note 230.
237. See Mazzoleni, supra note 233, at 265, 276-77.
238. Christiansen and Lintner observed that "a greater systematisation of the permanent
dialogues between the Commission and the single associations could lead to the rather
paradoxical outcome of competition between the regions and the CoR, with the latter claiming
that it is the only body to officially represent regional interests at the European level."
Christiansen & Lintner, supra note 66, at 3; see also Christopher K. Ansell et al., Dual Networks
in European Regional Development Policy, 35 J. COMMON MKT. STuD. 347, 350 (1997)
(exemplifying how EU regional development policy has triggered structural patterns of either
cooperation or competition among regions competing for money).
239. See Mazzoleni, supra note 233, at 266.
240. See Trioartite Contracts andAgreements, EUR. COMM'N, http://europa.eu/legislation-
summaries/regional policy/management/g24220_en.htm (last updated June 27, 2006) (giving no
specific example of these contracts implemented by regional policy).
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better cooperation among the different levels of government to achieve a
common goal.
B. Three Case Studies: Why the Context Matters
This Subpart shows how the legal, the socioeconomic, and the
territorial dimensions in each periphery plays a key role in determining
whether the cooperation between the EU and its subnational
governments is ultimately beneficial or not for local development in a
particular Member State.
1. Lack of Legal Standing for Sicily
Since the mid-1990s, in the framework of cohesion policy, the
Court of First Instance (CFI) can review the decisions of the Commission
adopted during the different implementation phases of the structural
funds.24 ' Thus, every decision adopted by the Commission to suspend or
reduce the funding of an approved project can be subject to judicial
review before the CFI as long as the applicants have legal standing.242 In
contrast to Member States and EU institutions, municipalities and
regions are not privileged applicants before the ECJ or the CFI in
challenging EU legislation.243 Several of these cases on local standing
were raised in the context of the Commission decisions about the
allocation or the suspension in the payment of Regional (ERDF) or other
types of EU funds to beneficiary regions.24
Both critics of regional blindness and new governance advocates
see in the locus standibefore the Courts a means to assert the importance
241. See Case T-465/93, Consorzio Grouppo di Azione Locale Murgia Messapica v.
Comm'n, 1994 E.C.R. 11-361 paras. 1-3.
242. See Scott, supra note 19, at 636-37 (commenting on the lack of legal standing of the
applicants in CFI Case T-585/93, Greenpeace and Others v. Comm'n, 1995 E.C.R. 11-2205, and
Case C-321/95 P, Stichting Greenpeace Council (Greenpeace International) and Others v.
Comm'n, 1998 ECR I-1651).
243. See TFEU art. 263, para. 2 (providing for jurisdiction only in suits brought by the
European Council, the Parliament, the Council or the Commission); id art. 263, para. 3 (giving
quasi-privileged standing to the Court of Auditors, the European Central Bank, and the
Committee of the Regions); Case C-95/97, R6gion Wallonne v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 1-1787;
Case C-452/98, Nederlandse Antillen v. Council, 2001 E.C.R. 1-8973; Case C-417/04, Regione
Siciliana v. Comm'n, 2006 E.C.R. 1-3881; Piet Van Nuffel, What's in a Member State?: Central
and DecentralizedAuthonties Before the Communty Court, 38 COMMoN MKT L. REv 871, 872
(2001).
244. See Case C-180/97, Regione Toscana v. Comm'n, 1997 E.C.R. 1-5245; Case T-81/97,
Regione Toscana v. Comm'n, 1998 E.C.R. 11-2889; Case C-417/04, Regione Siciiana, 2006
E.C.R. 1-3881; Case C-15/06 Regione Siciliana v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2591.
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of decentralization and regional autonomy.245 In adopting different types
of justifications, both groups suggest that by expanding legal standing to
local governments to review EU law in Luxembourg, such measures will
inevitably give a voice to local actors and in turn promote decentrali-
zation in Europe.2 4 6
In Regione Siciliana, local-federal cooperation on a development
project ended up backfiring and the involvement of the Italian
government did not change the outcome of a failed development
project.247 In December 1987, the European Commission approved a
grant to the Region of Sicily in Italy to finance, through the ERDF, the
final stage of works on the Gibbesi Dam.248 The purpose of the project
was to create a reservoir of water coming from the Gibbesi River that
would supply water to a planned industrial center to be built nearby in the
Licata province. A secondary objective of the dam was to provide water
to improve irrigation over 1000 hectares of land used for agricultural
purposes.249 The ERDF was supposed to cover 55% of the project, and
245. See Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Treaty Establishing a
Constitution for Europe, 2005 O.J. (C 71) 1, 4, para. 1.28; Koen Lenaerts, President of Chamber
at the EU Court of Justice, Address to REGLEG Conference: Access of Regions with Legislative
Powers to the European Court of Justice 1 (May 20, 2008). As to different conceptions of
pluralism in constitutional litigation, see David Feldman, Public Interest Litigation and
Constitutional Theory in Comparative Perspective, 55 MOD. L. REv. 44 (1992).
246. For instance, the critics of regional blindness have denounced the fact that regions
have "no direct access to the EC law-making processes and, moreover, that they have little
opportunity to challenge the validity of acts before the European Community's judicature, where
they have no better standing under Article 230 than a private individual." See Weatherill, supma
note 106, at 5.
Conversely, new governance advocates have addressed the question of locus standi not in
direct relation to the issue of local governments but rather in their effort to reconceptualize the
role of the judiciary in the new governance project. See Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as
Catalysts: Re-Thiaking the Judicial Role by New Governance, 13 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 565 (2007).
247. Case C-15/06, Regione Siciliana, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2591.
248. See Joined Cases T-392/03, T-408/03, and T-435/03, Regione Siciliana v. Comm'n,
2008 E.C.R. 11-2489, para. 1.
249. See Case T-60/03, Regione Siciliana v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 11-4139, para. 88 ("[I]n
the applicant's view, the fact that the water retained by the dam is henceforth wholly intended for
irrigation and no longer also for the cooling of industrial plant does not alter the nature of the
works in question, which is that of forming a reservoir of water for the common good. The
applicant mentions in this connection, without being contradicted by the Commission, that
provision had always been made for the water retained by the dam to be used to irrigate some
1000 hectares of land. It is the fact that the industrial centre which was from 1986 on to have
been built at Licata has never been started that has made irrigation the principal use of the water.
That state of affairs was reported to the Commission, it then being indicated that the works still
had a social and economic role to play in regional development. In this respect, it must be
considered that the dam, situated in a region that suffers from a serious lack of water for private,
agricultural and industrial use, might, on account of the quality of its water, satisfy many needs,
including that of drinking water, and form part of a broader overall scheme of water-supply
operations cofinanced by the ERDF.").
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the rest was to be financed by national and regional money provided by
the Italian authorities according to the additionality criterion established
by cohesion policies.250 The Commission sponsored 639 million in
advance and was supposed to pay a final amount of C10 million upon
completion of the project.251 While the construction works were finished
in November 1992, the Italian authorities asked for an extension of the
deadline for presenting the final report and payment request in March
1995.252 However, in 2000, when the Italian authorities sent a financial
report to the Commission, they also mentioned that the project was not
finished and they needed the final payment to complete and start
operating the Gibbesi Dam.25 3 In September 2001, the Commission told
the Italian authorities that the financial report was unclear because there
were irregularities in it and there was a possible cancellation of the final
grant.254 In 2002, the Commission decided to revoke the grant decision
of 1987 because the project was not yet operational. In the same
decision the Commission requested that the Italian government repay
£39 million to Brussels and that the final amount of E9.8 million should
be immediately decommitted from the Gibbesi project."
Following this decision, the Sicilian Region, the main beneficiary of
the grant, decided to sue the European Commission to seek the
annulment of its decision before the CFL. The region questioned the fact
that in the Commission's decision the finding of the irregularities in the
payment did not provide a valid basis for revoking the entire fund.256 In
response, the Commission argued that despite the fact that the applicant
had an individual interest in the outcome, it would nevertheless not have
standing because it was not directly concerned insofar as the structural
fund policies create a joint responsibility for the Commission and the
Member States only.257 Moreover, rather than the regions being the
interlocutors with the Commission in receiving the regional grants, the
Member States are the main interlocutors with the Commission in the
"system of decentralised management that constitutes one of the
fundamental features of the structural funds."25 8 Thus, according to the
Commission, the Italian government "enjoyed some discretion in the
250. Id. para. 4.
251. Id.
252. Id para. 7.
253. Id.para.5.
254. Id. para. 10.
255. Id paras. 13-15.
256. Id. paras. 19, 21.
257. Id. paras. 23-24.
258. Id para. 27.
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implementing of the contested decision."259 On this point, the CFI ruled
that the plea of inadmissibility by the Commission was rejected because
the contested decision left no discretion to the Italian government on its
implementation.260
As to the substance of the Commission's decision, there were two
main conflicts where the parties' opposite opinions over empirical issues
call into question whether the CFI is more appropriate for such litigation.
On the one hand, the parties contested whether the Gibbesi Dam Project
was nearly completed, and on the other, they contested whether the scope
of the Dam had changed from the original industrial objective upon
which it was funded by the Commission through the ERDE261
As to the completion of the Dam, the Court held that the
Commission was right on the fact that the Dam had not been completed,
and what Sicily claimed were only minimal parts of a huge infrastructure
were instead an integral rather than an ancillary part of the work at
issue.262 As to the changing objective of the project, Sicily argued that
"the fact that the water retained by the dam is henceforth wholly intended
for irrigation and no longer also for the cooling of industrial plants does
not alter the nature of the works in question, which is that of forming a
reservoir of water for the common good."263
While the Commission accepted the Gibbesi Dam proposal as
purely an industrial project, in contrast, Sicily claimed that the Dam had
been planned with the purpose of irrigating some 1000 hectares of
land.2" In addition, the Region had agreed to supervise the creation of an
industrial center that starting in 1986 was supposed to be built in the
outskirts of the city of Licata, the southern harbor of the island that
would have competed with Catania and Palermo.2 65  However, the
construction of the industrial center had never been started, and
irrigation, which was not completed yet, had become the principal use of
259. Id.
260. Id. paras. 54, 57, 68 ("[T]he contested decision also directly alters the applicant's legal
situation with regard to the duty to repay the sums paid by way of advances (approximately £39
million). In point of fact, the effect of the contested decision is directly to change the applicant's
legal status from that of unarguably being a creditor in respect of those sums to that of debtor, at
least potentially. The reason is that the contested decision means that it is no longer impossible
for the national authorities under both Community and domestic law to demand repayment from
the applicant of the sums advanced. In other words, the second direct and automatic effect of the
contested decision is to change the applicant's legal situation vis-A-vis the national authorities.").
261. Id. paras. 69-72.
262. Id para. 83.
263. Id para. 88.
264. Id.
265. Id
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the water collected by the Gibbesi Dam.266  Nevertheless, when the
Sicilian region had to report the state of affairs to Brussels in order to
receive the last payment, it mentioned that the Dam in that particular
geographic setting played a significant social and economic role for the
development of the region.267 However, the CFI held:
Given ... that the intended use of the project was significantly changed
without the Commission's prior approval, because the main objective of
supplying water to the complex at Licata was not attained, it must follow
that cancellation of the assistance is warranted in light of Article 24 of
Regulation No. 4253/88.268
This is not the first case in which money was withheld from the
applicant because of the changing objective or the changing plan of the
project during its implementation. Every construction project inevitably
incurs structural changes resulting from the nature of the territory, in
particular geographical areas where drought is increasingly becoming a
threat.269 Despite the fact that the CFI has interpreted incredibly strictly
the objectives under which the projects have been approved, especially
when the changing project requires more disbursement on the part of the
Commission, there are a large number of technical evaluations regarding
the necessity of a change in the approved project that might be better
evaluated through a different procedure rather than bringing the case in
Luxembourg. 270
The Sicilian region then appealed the case to the ECJ which upheld
the decision of the CFI but rejected its reasoning by holding that the
region lacked standing and that its action was inadmissible.17' The ECJ
266. See Caruso, supra note 121, at 6 ("Its construction started in the 1980s and is now
completed, but the proper infrastructure of channels that would allow for the agricultural fruition
of the river's water is still lacking. As a result, the precious water that accumulates from time to
time goes wasted, and many fields stay tragically dry.").
267. Case C-15106, Regione Siciliana v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2591.
268. Id. para. 102.
269. The threat is due to an archeological capital in the surrounding Agrigento temples, as
well as a specific mentalitd that is flexible and open to changes in undertaking the building of
large infrastructures.
270. See Case T-272/02, Comune di Napoli v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. I-1849 (finding that
Naples got funding to build a subway station and the grant was awarded, with a fix cap of euros
that Italy has originally required to build an underground rail of the subway). During the
construction work, the city of Naples decided it needed to move the project, which would cost
more money, in order to avoid serious traffic problems. Id para. 10. The city changed the project
in relying on further ERDF funding up to the maximum amount allocated but the Commission
did not award the rest of the money. Despite Naples' reliance on the funds to build the subway,
the ECJ upheld the Commission's decision. Id; see also Case C-46/03, U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ik
v. Comm'n, 2005 E.C.R. 1-10167 (holding the United Kingdom wins in a similar scenario in
which the Commission has refused to pay for the last installment of funds).
271. See Case C-15/06, Regione Sicihana, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2591, para. 44.
112 [Vol. 20
2011] DECENTRALIZATIONINEUCORESIONPOLICY 113
held that the applicant was not directly concerned with the Commission's
decision to refuse to pay the last tranche of the grant.272  The ECJ
interpreted the annex to the decision to grant, where the Region "is
referred to as the authority responsible for the application for financial
assistance" rather than the beneficiary of the grant.' According to the
court, a direct relationship exists only between the Union granting the
funds and the states that are principally responsible for the repayment of
the money instead of the region.274 The region is mainly an emanation of
the state without autonomy or responsibility in this case.275 Even now, the
Gibbesi Dam has not been completed and it remains one of the most
scandalous projects, standing out as the nightmare scenario in the
allocation of a large amount of structural funds over a long period of
time. 276
Following this case, in Ville Vesuviane, the European Court reached
a similar conclusion, namely that the Ente, the local authority in charge
of the renovation, was not directly affected by the decision of the
Commission to close its regional development fund assistance.277 In
following Advocate General Kokott's opinion and overruling the decision
of the CFI, the Court held that the Italian state remained the directly
concerned actor affected by the decision of the Commission even if the
Italian government claimed it was willing to recover the lost sums from
the Ente, thus showing it was a separate local institution.278
In both cases where the European Court decides not to give
standing to the local actors who are also the beneficiaries of the EU
regional development funds, the questions are whether these problems
should be a matter for law instead of politics, and whether the ex post
review of the ECJ is at all appropriate for these projects. Increasingly the
World Bank, and also the European Investment Bank and the European
272. Id.
273. Id. para. 36.
274. Id
275. See, e.g., Hunter v. City of Pittsburg, 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
276. See Diga Di Gibbesi: Una Struttura Della Diga Mai Temrnata, Dopo Oltre Vent'anni
Di Lavoro (Gibbesi Dam: An Unfinished Structure Afler Twenty Years of Work), CoNTRASTO,
http://www.contrasto.it/index.php (last visited Oct. 1, 2011).
277. Joined Cases C-445/07 P and C-455/07 P, Comm'n v. Ente per le Ville Vesuviane,
2009 E.C.R. 1-7993 para. 1-2.
278. Id para. 60 ("As stated by the Advocate General in point 64 of her Opinion, the
findings of the Court of First Instance are insufficient to draw inferences regarding the
subsequent conduct of the addressee of the contested decision. It is not possible solely from the
legally non-binding pronouncement by the Italian authorities of their intention to recover the
assistance from Ente to arrive at the conclusion that Ente is directly concerned, since, amongst
other things, it cannot be ruled out that special circumstances might lead the Italian State, as one
of Ente's shareholders, to forebear from claiming the repayment from Ente.").
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Bank for Reconstruction and Development, have used alternative
accountability mechanisms addressing the implementation of their
financed projects. In doing so, they have opened themselves to possible
criticism from individuals, NGOs, and other local actors affected by their
development projects. Scholars have written on the important role of
these accountability mechanisms in opening international financial
bodies to criticisms, changing the behavior of the management and
allowing a wide range of affected parties to monitor and bring
complaints through several inspection panels of administrative
mechanisms.279
An accountability mechanism of this sort might prevent getting the
European Court into the game at a very late stage in the process and
having to deal with a subject matter that requires much more input from
locally and territorially based expertise and should therefore conduct
more research on the goals and the mechanism to implement the project.
For instance, in addressing social exclusion and how to prevent certain
populations from ending up in a poverty situation by targeting income,
education, health, and employment, the Barca Report explains that a
"territorialised social agenda" needs to build on local knowledge on how
to involve the local constituencies in sharing knowledge and
experience.280 Barca suggests that in this context:
The action of the EU Court of Justice can undo national rules that produce
perverse social results, but cannot positively build new rules which address
the issue. The option of transferring sovereignty for welfare intervention to
the EU, as in economic areas, is not feasible owing to cultural diversity and
differing national aspirations and social models as well as to the lack of
political legitimacy of the EU level of government.28'
Thus, the European Court might not be the appropriate forum to
adjudicate if the decisions of the Commission to stop the disbursement of
the funds, given its narrow working tools, based on the interpretation that
article 263(4) of the TFEU is in clear contrast with a deeper and more
territorially attuned understanding of how to create local development
and who are the constituencies directly impacted by EU cohesion policy.
279. See David Hunter, Ushig the World Bank Inspection Panel to Defend the Interests of
Project-Afected People, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 201, 202, 210-11 (2003); Mariarita Circi, The World
Bank Inspection Panel: Is It Really Effective., 6 GLOBAL ADMIN. L. & GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1
(2006); Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The Case of the
WorldBankInspection Panel, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 553, 554, 556 (1994).
280. BARCA REPORT, supra note 160, at 120.
281. Seeidat 122-23.
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2. Intranational Heterogeneity: German Linder
The creation of federal-local cooperation in each Member State
cannot be generalized because of a great deal of variation that takes place
within each Member State. Intranational heterogeneity in the behavior of
subnational actors toward the EU has increasingly attracted scholarly
attention.282 Each region, province, or city is different from another due
to its different geographic, economic, and political power that mobilizes
regional and local elites vis-A-vis the national governments and vis-A-vis
the EU in very different ways. This Part explores the tensions that arose
between the thirteen Linderin the postunification regime of the 1990s in
order to show how intra-Lider disparities have triggered very diverse
patterns toward European cohesion policies. These disparities are either
grounded in different political ideologies, left or right, or they emerge
from wealth inequalities among the Liider.
As several authors demonstrated in Germany, among thirteen
Linder, with different levels of wealth and political cultures, EC
development policies triggered very different outcomes.283 M agining a
continuum in the behavior of the German Linder, on the one hand, some
L&der became the perfect example of multilevel governance whereby
they created a successful alliance with the Commission in the
implementation of structural funds while undermining the power of their
central government. On the other end of the continuum, other L&7der
have engaged with different intensity with EU cohesion policies.
However, they have found a more productive collaboration with the
central government, albeit by entering into conflicted relations with
Brussels. Finally, those Linder who have received very little or no
structural funds from Brussels have sought greater autonomy from the
EU and its increasing expansion of competence over their social welfare
domains.
Some authors have explained intranational heterogeneity in
Germany through political and ideological differences characterizing the
political elites governing each Lbider.84 For instance, the two major
ideologies that predominated during the drafting of the Constitutional
282. See, eg., TANJA A. BORZEL, STATES AND REGIONS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:
INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION IN GERMANY AND SPAIN (2002); Pieter van Houten, Globalation and
Demands for RegionalAutonomy in Europe, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL EcoNoMY: POLITICAL
AUTHORITY IN TRANSInON 110, 111 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003).
283. See Michael W Bauer, The German Linder and the European Constitutional Treaty:
Headng for a Differentiated Theory of Regional Elite Preferences for European Integation, 16
REGIONAL & FED. STUD. 21, 23 (2006).
284. Id.
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Treaty in Germany were, on the one hand, the requests for greater
participation in the European process, while on the other, the demands
for greater regional autonomy from Europeanization. 285  The existing
cleavages between the left and the right in Germany, reflected by the two
main opposing parties, the Social-Democrats, and the Christian-
Democrats, explains in part the regional differences in requesting either
more EU partnership versus more autonomy from the EU.
Social-Democrat Lkider such as North-Rhine-Westphalia tend to
be more populated and wealthier per capita when compared with the less
wealthy and more conservative Ldinder, such as Bavaria in the South.286
In describing the conflicting visions behind cohesion strategies in the EU,
Chris Rumford has persuasively shown how two competing narratives
pervade European development strategies: cohesion and autonomi-
zation.287 Rumford portrays the autonomization as a narrative with strong
ties to neoliberalism that promote regionalism as a way to favor growth
and less centralized state control.288 For instance, North-Rhine-
Westphalia opposed the idea that the Ldnder should reject the entire
Constitutional Treaty. This proposal was made by some Ldnder seeking
to create an individual right for the regions to appeal to the ECJ directly
in case of an infringement of the subsidiarity and proportionality
principles by EU law.2" This proposal came from Bavaria, which often
coalesces with Hesse and Baden-Wirttemberg.290 Conversely, from
North-Rhine-Westphalia, three Linder are governed by Christian-
Democrats that tend to be at the forefront in their demands for greater
autonomy and self-governance.29' Autonomy demands from the EU
consist of enhancing local self-governance through subsidiarity and
proportionality. These demands seek to restrict the internal market
provisions enshrined in the EU treaty and reject soft law policies on
tourism, education, and public health due to their encroachment on
exclusive competences of the Lknder.292 Political ideology has played an
important role in allying Ldinder in a spectrum of more partnership with
or greater autonomy from the EU.
285. Id. at 29-30.
286. Id. at 32.
287. RUMFORD, supid note 212, at 68.
288. Id.
289. Bauer, supa note 283, at 32.
290. Id at 30-31.
291. Id
292. Id. at 28. As to the demands to reform the EU treaty, the Linder have proposed the
abolition of article 308 that creates powers not expressly enumerated by the Treaty for the
Community based on the unanimity voting.
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As to the economic disparities among the Lnder, these have not
only triggered different behaviors towards Europe but they have also
created problems of inter-Ldnder coordination vis-A-vis Brussels.293 In
the context of cohesion policies, the cleavage between poor and wealthy
Lfinder became more evident because the former sought to cooperate
with Brussels to obtain structural funds, while the latter sought greater
autonomy form Brussels's encroaching regulations.294 For instance,
Bavaria and Saxony developed different attitudes towards the EU. As
Charles Jeffrey pointed out, in 1998 the intranational heterogeneity of
these two Lkider vis-A-vis the cohesion policy promoted different
behaviors. Whereby Bavaria is wealthy and very influential internally,
Saxony is poorer and has a strong interest in capturing EU funding from
Objective 1 of the structural funds.295
But cooperation with Brussels is at times unpredictable for the
Lder and the alliance with the Commission does not always undermine
the power of the central government. For instance, the allocation of
structural funds in North-Rhine-Westphalia has increased the partnership
between the Ltnder and the Commission but it did not necessarily
undermine the authority of the central government.29 Rather, in Thomas
Conzelmann's account, the imposition of restrictions on the part of the
Commission through its competition and state aid policies became a
huge burden for the Lander in implementing cohesion policies. Similar
to the Sicilian case but with a less dramatic result, the partnership with
the Commission entails benefits as well as constraints that can at times
be even more severe than the one imposed by national governments.
Another important example of regional disparities as a source of
intranational heterogeneity in Germany is the different political attitude
between the Western and the five former Eastern Linder, the latter
having created multilevel alliances with Brussels in the context of
cohesion policies.297 As Jeffery Anderson explained, the unification of
293. See Charles Jefferey, Farewell to the Third Level? The German Lnder and the
European Policy Process, in THE REGIONAL DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: TOWARDS A
THIRD LEVEL EUROPE?, supra note 3, at 57.
294. See Charlie Jeffery, Sub-National Mobilization and European Integration: Does It
MakeAnyDiference?, 38 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 1 (2000).
295. Charles Jeffrey, Que gouvement les rigions d'Europe? tchanges poitiques et
mobilisationsr6gionales, Sous la direction d'Emmanuel N6grier et Bernard Jouve 55 (1998).
296. See Thomas Conzelmann, Networking and the Politics of EU Regional Policy:
Lessons from North Rhine- Westphalia, Nord-Pas de Calais and North West England 5 REGIONAL
&FED. STUD. 134, 174 (1995).
297. See Jeffrey J. Anderson, Germany and the Structural Funds: Unification Leads to
Bifurcation, in COHESION POLICY AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: BUILDING MULTI-LEVEL
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Germany in 1990 transformed the role of the country vis-d-vis Europe.
The "spatial and territorial bifurcation" in the postunification situation
transformed Germany into both a major contributor and also a receiver of
structural funds from the EU 2 9' Not only the distribution of wealth
between Eastern and Western Ldnderwas different but more interestingly
the decentralization in the former Eastern Linder resulted in a weak
model without independent intraregional relations.299 Thus, European
cohesion policies in the early 1990s did not create the interaction
between the supranational and the subnational level that was hoped for,
but it completely depended on the central government."o0 However,
things changed dramatically after 1994 when-after their intense
lobbying before Bonn and Brussels-the former Eastern Ldnder were
enlisted as major recipients of the structural funds similar to other
peripheral European regions.30 ' In this case, the new Lfinder were
empowered through EU policies that allowed them to "escape the
confines of federal policy regime."30 2
Political ideological differences together with wealth disparities
among Lhider have played a key role in influencing the power struggles
for attracting resources and political power in Germany that increasingly
involve the EU. For instance, the weaker the Lhiider is because local
elites do not control the federal government or because its economic
situation is not flourishing, the more the partnership with the EU to
receive structural funds becomes attractive. In contrast, stronger Linder
that are more advantaged both from an economic as well as a political
standpoint and are unlikely to receive structural funds have pushed for
greater autonomy and independence from the EU.
3. Intralocal Heterogeneity: Greek Cities
Today Greece remains one of the more centralized or unitary states
of the EU. Its prefectures and its municipalities have limited power and
inadequate resources to engage in innovative metropolitan and urban
GOVERNANCE, supra note 151, at 164 (showing that the Eastern German Lifnder have used
cohesion policies to undermine the power of their national governments).
298. Id
299. Id. at 178 ("Thus the new Linder are unable to structure intraregional relations with
complete independence. As such, territorial interactions within eastern Linder are not fully
decoupled from national policies and politics, as they are in the old Lander.").
300. Id. at 179.
301. Id. at 183-86.
302. Id. at 188 (explaining that thanks to the lobbying of the eastern Linder the federal
criteria to allocate regional funding were now lifted at the discretion of each Lindei). Even
though many old Linderchose to keep the federal criteria established by the German government
prior the unification. Id
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policies. While local authorities lack financial and administrative
autonomy to implement fully EU cohesion policies, structural funds
represent a crucial resource for the national economy. In the 1990s,
national devolution reforms created thirteen Regional Administrations
that "did not transform the centralized nature of the state and the
institutional relationships between center and periphery."303 Despite the
reorganization of local authorities by merging the numerous
municipalities and through the direct election of the prefectures, as
second tier local authorities, decentralization of power was not
successful. Currently, urban policies remain fundamentally centralized
in Greece." Thus, EU cohesion policies have only partially contributed
to decentralization. In reality decentralization reforms in Greece began
significantly before the introduction of structural funds, as a sign of
modernization of a country seeking to join the EU.30s
The case of Greece is an interesting one because as a unitary state,
EU cohesion policies could have triggered successful federal-local
cooperation by empowering subnational governments and undermining
the power of the central government.
The peripheral position of Greece vis-A-vis the EU has channeled
Europeanization as a synonym for modernization for local elites through
what scholars have called a hegemonic cultural imposition."o' Despite
weak decentralization and the limited power of Greek subnational actors,
EU policies have a different impact depending on the power and on the
type of agency of each territorial actor. The most striking example of the
heterogeneous impact of cohesion policies is the one among munici-
palities having to adjust to Europeanization. A brilliant study of three
different Greek cities in the implementation of the Community Initiatives
(CIs) launched by the Commission reveals such intralocal heterogene-
ity.307
CIs were introduced in 1989 as an additional EU cohesion policy
measure attempting to target local and regional governments through
flexible policy instruments. CIs referred to "specific problems of
303. See CHARALAMPOs KOUTALAKIS, CITIES AND THE STRUCTURAL FUNDs: THE
DOMESTIC IMPACT OF EU INITIATIVES FOR URBAN DEVELOPMENT 23 (2003) ("The newly created
regional administration are not elected but serve as decentralized structures of central government
headed by central government appointees.").
304. Id. at 61-63.
305. Id. at 24; Featherstone, supra note 198.
306. See Featherstone, supra note 198, at 25 (explaining that the EU impact on Greece can
be seeing through the lenses of Gramscian hegemony by "narrowing of the domestic agenda; the
importation of previously alien policy philosophies; and the inculcation of a 'disciplinary neo-
liberalism').
307. See KOUTALAKIS, supra note 303, at 97.
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regional restructuring" varying from topics such as industrial decline in
specific sectors, addressing disadvantaged regions, targeting decline in
the labor market through vocational training, technological innovation,
developing tourism, or alterative energies."8 CIs concerned a very wide
range of initiatives, including social, economic, and technological
innovation but with the characteristic of "being implemented on a small
scale."309 In particular, projects such as "URBAN" or "EMPLOYMENT"
aimed at addressing problems like urban decline, deterioration of living
conditions, and unemployment arising in urban settings."0 Scholars from
the Southern European countries identified a Northern European bias in
the policy objectives of these programs.3 1' For instance, the problems
identified for industrial centers such as Amsterdam, Frankfurt, or
Copenhagen were radically different from the ones arising in Greece,
Southern Italy, or Portugal where homelessness is almost nonexistent due
to family and land market structures. Thus, CIs often created
mismatches in their implementation in Southern European countries.
In a study on the implementation of "URBAN" and
"EMPLOYMENT,"312 Charlampos Koutalakis shows that domestic urban
policies and the local administration tend to cooperate or collide with the
European initiatives creating different pressures for adjustment in three
different Greek cities.' In the case of Volos, a medium-size municipality
of about 77,000 inhabitants in western Greece and the capital of the
prefecture of Magnisia, CIs triggered a fruitful cooperation between
municipal and supranational actors. Deindustrialization and increasing
unemployment since the 1980s caused intraurban disparities in living
conditions and increasing segregation among social groups in Volos.314
"URBAN" and "EMPLOYMENT" aimed at restructuring local
employment structures, upgrading urban planning intervention, and
supporting social cohesion through the creation of child care centers,
308. SeeTommel, supm note 149, at 52-80.
309. Id at 62.
310. Council Regulation 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999, Laying Down General Provisions of
the Structural Funds, 1999 O.J. (L 161) 1 (EC); KOUTALAKIS, supra note 303, at 39-41 (showing
that the budgetary reduction for the period 1994-1999 was E10.44 billion, which meant a
reduction from 9% to 5.3%).
311. KouTALAKis, supm note 303, at 52 (showing how for poverty issues European CL and
Greek urban policies tend to address very different problems).
312. The Urban program was established with Regulation OJC 180.2.94 of 15th of July
1994 laying down the relevant guidelines for URBAN; whereas EMPLOYMENT was established
with Regulation OJC 200/13 of the 10th of July 1996, laying down the relevant guidelines for
EMPLOYMENT. See KOuTALAKIS, supm note 303, at 44-52.
313. Seeid at97-98.
314. Id at 138-39.
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among other things.315 Because of the limited number of actors interested
in urban policies and the noncompetitive environment, Koutalakis
demonstrates how in Volos the URBAN initiatives stimulated successful
policy initiatives to implement the CIs by intralocal cooperation among
municipalities."'
In contrast to Volos, in Thessaloniki and Athens, the two biggest and
more industrialized Greek cities, the CIs sought to target similar pockets
of urban deprivations in peripheral suburbs with illegal construction and
the absence of urban planning.' The difference between these two cities
and Volos in the implementation of the CIs was the larger number of
local actors involved because of the lack both in Athens and Thessaloniki
of a single metropolitan government with urban competences.' 8 Here
local authorities are highly fragmented, involving a large number of local
branches of the central government as well as nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) in managing urban policies together with
municipal authorities.3 " This congested plethora of local, governmental,
and private actors contributing to the implementation of CIs has triggered
competition rather than cooperation, often undermining the scope of
creating new structures for urban governance.320 However, in some cases,
the Prefecture of Thessaloniki rather than the municipalities has
successfully worked as an umbrella agency coordinating the various
actors in the partnership with "employment" initiatives."'
Overall, Koutalakis demonstrates how in highly fragmented
municipal settings-with unequal distribution of resources and lack of
structures for metropolitan governance both in Athens and in
Thessaloniki-cities tend to collide rather than cooperate when having to
adjust to the requests to receive the money through the CIs. The
competitive attitude of local actors in attracting resources, by avoiding
collaboration or hiding information, demonstrates the limits of the CI's
multilevel approach in mobilizing municipalities for urban policies.322
315. Id. at 162.
316. Id at 175.
317. While Thessaloniki has an important harbor that connects Greece to the Balkans and
is smaller than the capital, City of Athens, the capital concentrates cultural, administrative, and
transport activities that connect the entire country as well the rest of Europe. Id. at 183. Both
cities have about 750,000 inhabitants and they are the central cities in the regions of respectively
Macedonia and Attica.
318. Id. at 196.
319. Id at 198.
320. Id. at 253.
321. Id at 254.
322. Id at 255-57.
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Part B has focused on the outcomes of EU structural funds in
Germany, Greece, and Italy to show how these funds have had a different
impact in each Member State. Rather than explaining these cases
through a local autonomy perspective, the cooperation between the EU
and the German Linder, the Italian regions, and the Greek cities are
highly dependent on both state background rules as well as the diverse
distribution of territorial and economic power among local actors. In
each Member State there are stories of success (some Linder, some
Greek cities) but also failure and backlash (Sicily, some Linder, some
Greek cities). Thus, EU regional policies can generate new conflicts or
new forms of centralization (Sicily, North-Rhine-Westphalia and
Athens).323
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article offers a critique of two different ideas that characterize
recent EU strategies to decentralize power. First, I show that the EU is
"going local" by lumping together local governments into a "third level
Europe" that does not differentiate among the diverse structures and
levels of government that differ in each Member State. Second,
decentralization through EU cohesion policy can either empower or
disempower local actors vis-A-vis state, supranational and other local
governments depending on the different Member States' constitutional
regimes characterizing the internal distribution of power as well as the
territorial and socioeconomic disparities among subnational actors.
Therefore, the outcomes of EU cohesion policies can often centralize
power in Brussels or "recentralize" power in the Member States with
negative results for the local development project. In response to current
proposals by scholars committed to improving "input legitimacy" in
European judicial and regulatory strategies on how to increase local
autonomy, this Article offers a textured account of the effects of EU
cohesion policy on subnational actors in Italy, Germany, and Greece.
Rather than a plea for greater decentralization, EU cohesion policy
should be better tailored to pursue the different development goals in
each territory. The lesson learned from EU cohesion policy is one that
should "travel" to other areas of EU regulation, such as environmental,
internal market, and even financial regulation. With this lesson in mind,
EU and national politicians ought to be more attuned to territorial and
legal differences characterizing each Member State because these will
determine the effects of EU-wide policies on particular territories.
323. See Davidson, supra note 150.
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